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“Human rights are inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place 
of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status. 
We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination.”
1
 The core of the 
international system for the promotion and protection of these rights are human rights 
treaties (HRTs).
2
 With the level of importance human rights possess the assumption is 
that states would ratify HRTs immediately. Unfortunately, not all states either ratify these 
treaties or do so quickly. In this thesis I focus on the poorer countries of the world (Least 
Developed Countries, LDCs). I hypothesize that LDCs are motivated to ratify human 
rights treaties (HRTs) by the prospect of obtaining economic aid and legitimacy. 
 Before delving into which motive influenced Lesotho and Bangladesh to ratify 
treaties, I looked into what delayed them for so long. The three obstacles which could 
possibility affect a country’s ratification are: (a) political instability; (b) lack of economic 
and bureaucratic issues; and/or (c) cultural issues. Lesotho and Bangladesh each 
encountered these obstacles. Lesotho experienced a one party rule for 20 years (1970-
1986) followed by a seven year military regime (1986-1993), therefore it was determined 
political instability played a significant factor in its ratification. Bangladesh democratized 
in 1991 and experienced a fairly stable period until 1998. During this period little 
progress was made in the area of human rights and thus it was determined political 
instability was not the primary impediment in Bangladesh’s case. The lack of economic 
                                                          
1
 “What Are Human Rights,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, accessed December 9, 2014, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx. 
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and bureaucratic resources was an obstacle that both countries encountered. Evidence 
suggested the lack of resources delayed their domestication of the treaty’s provisions not 
their ratification. With respect to cultural issues it had a minor effect in delaying Lesotho 
and Bangladesh in ratifying HRTs.  
Overall, legitimacy was a more significant factor when these LDCs decided to 
ratify than economic aid. Since these countries received official development aid (ODA) 
more or less throughout the period under review, their ODA contributions were not 
related to their adherence to human rights treaties. 
I conclude that there is evidence to support further research on the impact of the 
spread of human rights norms and the search for legitimacy among least developed 
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Chapter 1- Rationale for Thesis   
On January 1, 1924 prior to the end of the war, the League of Nations (LoN) 
made a declaration motivated by the extent of the damage World War I had created. The 
LoN, with the assistance of nongovernmental activists, pledged to continue fighting 
against the Axis powers. This commitment was strengthened on December 10, 1948 
when the United Nations (UN) and its member states adopted the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), which laid the foundation for the first concerted efforts to 
protect the human rights of all people. Since then, the majority of states have joined at 
least one of the ten core International Human Rights Treaties3 (HRTs) and attention to 
human rights within the United Nations and other international organizations, both 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental, has flourished.
4
    
The United Nations international human rights treaties (HRTs) serve as the 
backbone of the global human rights regime. Unlike UN declarations, these instruments 
are legally binding documents and therefore are more capable of promoting global human 
                                                          
3
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OP-CAT), 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), International 
Conventional for Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD) 
4
 Christine Min Wotipka and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: 
State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001,” Sociological Forum 23, 





  When confronted with a treaty, countries may decline to join, sign, and later 
ratify with reservations or ratify 
unconditionally.
6
  A state’s decision to ratify signifies a deeper sense of commitment 
since ratification results in being voluntarily bound by the treaty. In ratifying, states 
undertake the responsibility to create laws pertaining to the specific treaty and to 
implement them on a domestic level. There are instances when a state may take the initial 
step of signing an HRT but  not go through with ratification. As a result, years may pass 
before the state revisits the HRT and finally decides to ratify the treaty. A state’s reason 
for ratifying after a prolonged period may derive from a number of factors; for the 
purposes of this thesis two related factors will be explored: the recognition of the 
economic benefits to be gained from developed countries, and the search for international 
legitimacy. According to Wotipka and Kiyoteru, as states increasingly participate in 
international society, they tend to internalize human rights norms and use ratification of 
human rights treaties as a signal to other countries that they are legitimate members of the 
international society.
7
 Governments that need more legitimacy in international society are 
more likely to ratify human rights treaties, because they need a cover for their domestic 
human rights problems.8                   
In the case of least developed countries (LDCs), a core argument is that these 
countries ratify human rights treaties because they are motivated by aid concerns rather 
                                                          
5
 Wade M. Cole, “Hard and Soft Commitments to Human Rights Treaties, 1966-2000,” 
Sociological Forum 24, no. 3 (September 2009): 565. 
6
 Ibid., 567. 
7
 Christine Min Wotipka and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: 
State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001,” Sociological Forum 23, 
no. 4 (December 2008): 736. 
8
 Ibid., 749. 
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than because the state is genuinely concerned about human rights. On the other hand, like 
other states, LDCs seek the legitimacy that derives from ratifying treaties. States might 
ratify human rights treaties because they see ratification as what they “are supposed to 
do” in order to be good global citizens. Therefore, ratification is used to present a country 
as a member in good standing in the international community. If a state commits to the 
treaty it can deflect criticisms as well as pressure and unwanted attention.  However, 
often these states have difficulty committing to these treaties. In some cases, LDCs are 
unable to ratify due to political instability, lack of economic resources to support the 
agencies and programs that must be established under the treaty, and/or cultural 
differences. These factors often lead to LDCs’ delay in ratifying human rights treaties in 
a timely manner. It is important to discuss the factors cited. 
Treaties were created to protect the human rights of individuals and to create 
norms to help protect people everywhere from severe political, religious, legal and social 
abuses.
9
 States that adopt an HRT should genuinely be a part of a community that cares 
to stop severe abuses and promote a better quality of life for its citizens. HRTs are legally 
binding agreements that states should uphold and respect; if a state is unable to keep its 
commitment to human rights then its intentions should be questioned.    
This research is guided by the idea that while global adherence to human rights 
norms is obviously highly desirable, least developed countries (LDCs), which form the 
bulk of nations in the world, encounter unique difficulties when it comes to ratifying 
treaties. In Chapter 2, I will delve into my research design. 
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 James Nickel, “Human Rights,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, Winter 2014,  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/rights-human/. 
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Chapter 2- Research Design 
As stated in Chapter 1, it is often said, as one factor, that least developed countries 
ratify human rights treaties in exchange for economic incentives given by developed 
countries. For example Wotipka and Tsutsui state that hegemonic states take advantage 
of their standing to apply pressure, economic as well as military, to force other states to 
adopt human rights policies that are in line with their ideology or interests. Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink  state, "[w]ith regard to Third World countries, one could also assume that 
human rights conditions improve resulting from pressures by the World Bank and/or 
donor countries employing good governance criteria. State actors in Third World 
countries might enact liberalizing measures in order to get financial and economic 
development aid from the West or from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).”1 
 In terms of my second proposal, that states gain legitimacy via ratification, some 
human rights changes occur because a country’s leaders care about the perception of 
leaders of other countries. In this respect, James Fearon introduces the distinction 
between rules and norms: rules take the form of “do X to get Y,” while norms take a 
different form of “good people do X.” Thus, people sometimes follow norms because 
they want others to think well of them, and because they want to think well of 
themselves.
2
 People’s ability to think well of themselves is influenced by norms that are 
held by a relevant community of actors.   
                                                          
1
 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 35. 
2
 Ibid., 8. 
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A state may decline to join a human rights treaty, sign it, ratify it with 
reservations, or ratify it unconditionally.
3
 It may also accede to a treaty. Signing a treaty 
implies a weaker obligation under international law than ratification. According to the 
U.N. Treaty Handbook (2001:3) 
A signing State does not undertake positive legal obligation under the treaty upon 
signature… [Signature] allows States time to seek approval for the treaty at the 
domestic level and to enact any legislation necessary to implement the treaty 
domestically, prior to undertaking the legal obligation under the treaty at the 
international level.4  
Ratification… refer[s] to the act undertaken on the international plane, whereby a 
State establishes its consent to be bound by a treaty… Once a State has ratified a 
treaty at the international level, it must give effect to the treaty domestically. 
Upon ratification, the State becomes legally bound under the treaty.5  
Accession combines signature and ratification into a single act, and succession, 
whereby a newly established state accepts the treaty obligation of its predecessor.6    
 
This thesis will attempt to do two things, first to uncover what caused some Least 
Developed Country (LDCs) to delay their ratification of human rights treaties by ten 
years or more (explained below), and second to assess whether the prospect of receiving 
aid and legitimacy drives them to finally ratify. LDCs were selected as the focus of this 
thesis for the reason that they are economically handicapped, have low human 
development and are the most susceptible to accepting economic aid due to their 
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 Wade M. Cole, “Hard and Soft Commitments to Human Rights Treaties, 1966-2000,” 
Sociological Forum 24, no. 3 (September 2009): 571 
4
 Ibid., 571 
5
 Ibid., p. 567 
6
 Ibid., 571 
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hardships. For them, ratifying human rights treaties may be a way to obtain and maintain 
economic aid from the international community while simultaneously gaining legitimacy 
for ratifying.  The reason I chose a period of ten years was because a preliminary analysis 
showed that the majority of states ratify within ten years of a human rights treaty’s entry 
into force.  
What are Least Developed Countries?   
The least developed country category comprises low-income developing countries 
which face severe structural impediments to growth.7 Indicators of such impediments are 
the high vulnerability of the countries’ economies and their low level of human capital. 8 
The UN Office of High Commissioner, advised by the Committee for 
Development Planning (CDP), first put together a list of countries in 1971. The CDP is a 
subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social Council, which reviews LDCs every 
three years and monitors their progress after graduation from the category.9 Initially, 
there were 24 countries which grew over the years to 48. Today the UN Office of the 
High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing 
Countries and Small Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) uses the following criteria to 
identify and define LDCs: gross national income (GNI per capita), low level of human 
assets, and economic vulnerability to external shock. The two last elements are measured 
using the human asset index (HAI) and the economic vulnerability index (EVI). The low 
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 United Nations et al., Handbook on the Least Developed Country Category: Inclusion, 
Graduation, and Special Support Measures. (New York: United Nations, 2008). 
8
 Ibid., p.1. 
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income criterion is based on a three-year average estimate of GNI per capita, based on the 
World Bank Atlas method as of 2012. For a country to be classified as an LDC it must 
have a GNI of under $992 (US).10 The GNI criterion is critical in analyzing a state’s 
financial standing. GNI per capita can provide an indication of the income position of a 
country vis-à-vis other developing countries.11 It provides for a rough estimate of the 
productive capacity of an economy and the state’s ability to provide requisite services.12   
The Human Asset Index (HAI) provides information about the level of 
development of human capital.13 The human asset index has two indictors for health and 
nutrition and two for education. Those indicators are as follows: (a) nutrition- percentage 
of population undernourished; (b) health- mortality rate for children aged five years and 
under; (c) education- gross secondary school enrollment ratio; and (d) adult literacy rate. 
These indicators are an important measure because undernourishment compromises one’s 
health status and educational achievement and has an important negative impact on 
productivity.14 Similarly, the mortality rate for children aged 5 years and under is a 
measure of child survival and reflects the social, economic and environmental conditions 
in which children (and others in society) live, including health care.15 A low level of 
education is the main obstacle to development as it implies shortage of skills for the 
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 “Least Developed Countries,” UN-OHRLLS UN Office of the High Representative for the Least 
Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, 
accessed March 9, 2014, http://unohrlls.org/. 
11
 United Nations et al., Handbook on the Least Developed Country Category. 
12
 Ibid., p.39 
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organization and functioning of the economy.16 It also reflects a low capacity on behalf of 
the population to absorb technological advances.  
The Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) attempts to capture the relative risk 
posed to a country’s development by exogenous shocks. The EVI is based on the 
following indicators: (a) population size; (b) remoteness; (c) merchandise export 
concentration; (d) share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in GDP; (e) share of 
population living in low elevated coastal zones; (f) instability of exports of goods and 
services; (g) number of victims of natural disasters (explanation below); (h) instability of 
agricultural production. The period for which victims of natural disasters varies with each 
CDP triennial review of LDCs. For instance, in the 2006 review the period spanned from 
1990 through 2004. In the 2012 review the timeframe was from 1991 through 2010.  
Based on UN-OHRLLS criteria it can be stated that these countries are poor and 
less industrialized than the rest of the world. Because LDCs are economically 
handicapped, they are often unable to provide their populations with basic necessities (i.e. 
food, clean and safe drinking water, etc.) and sustainable infrastructures (i.e. schools, 
hospitals). For instance, the creation of the eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) was in large part done to address and assist LDCs. These goals are: (1) eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender 
equality and empower women; (4) reduce child morality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) 
combat HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; 
and (8) create a global partnership for development. It is no coincidence that the OH-
RLLS criteria for LDCs match the majority of the MDG goals. These goals were created 
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 Ibid., p.46 
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to reach the world’s poorest, and that intended population resides within the 48 LDCs. 
Table 2.1 gives the list of 48 countries the UN OH-RLLS has identified as least 
developed countries, as of 2013.  
Table 2:1 The UN-OHRLLS list of Least Developed Countries & Date of Inclusion  
Country              Date of Inclusion to the list  Country             Date of Inclusion to the list 
Afghanistan                                        1971            Madagascar                                      1991 
Angola                                                1994  Malawi                                             1971    
Bangladesh                                         1975 Mali                                                  1971 
Benin                                                  1971 Mauritania                                        1986 
Bhutan                                                1971 Mozambique                                    1988 
Burkina Faso                                      1971 Myanmar                                          1987 
Burundi                                              1971    Nepal                                                1971 
Cambodia                                           1991 Niger                                                1971 
Central African Republic                   1975 Rwanda                                            1971 
Chad                                                   1971 Sao Tome and Principe                    1982       
Comoros                                             1977 Senegal                                             2000 
Dem. Rep of the Congo                     1991 Sierra Leone                                     1982 
Djibouti                                              1982 Solomon Islands                               1991 
Equatorial Guinea                              1982 Somalia                                             1971 
Eritrea                                                1994 South Sudan                                      2012 
Ethiopia                                             1971 Sudan                                                1971       
Gambia                                              1975 Timor-Leste                                      2003 
Guinea                                               1971 Togo                                                  1982     
Guniea- Bissau                                  1981 Tuvalu                                               1986 
Haiti                                                   1971 Uganda                                              1971 
Kiribati                                              1986      United Rep. of Tanzania                   1971           
Lao People’s Dem. Republic            1971 Vanuatu                                             1985 
Lesotho                                              1971 Yemen                                               1971    
Liberia                                               1990 Zambia                                              1991 
Source: “About LDCsA Propos Des Pays Les Moins Avancés,” UN-OHRLLS, accessed 
November 20, 2014, http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/. 
 
Methodology 
In order to assess my hypothesis, I have chosen to do two case studies. The 




Step 1- Identification of the core Human Rights Treaties 
Below are the most important HRTs, the dates they were formulated, and the dates 
they came into force.  
Table 2.2: Human Rights Treaties 
Human Rights Treaty Date established Entry into force 
International Convention on the  
Elimination of All Forms of Racial  
Discrimination (ICERD)  
 
March 7, 1966 January 4, 1969 
International Covenant on Civil and  
Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
December 16, 1966 March 23, 1976 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social & Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
 
December 16, 1966 March 23,1976 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against  
Women (CEDAW) 
 
December 18, 1979 September 3, 1981 
Convention against Torture and Other  
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT)  
 
December 10, 1984 June 26, 1987 
Convention on the Rights of the Child  
(CRC)  
November 20, 1989 September 2, 1990  
   
Source: UN Treaty Collection, “United Nations Treaty Collection,” Chapter IV: Human Rights, 
accessed November 20, 2014, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
 
I selected three out of the six core human rights treaties for further analysis: 
ICCPR, ICESCR and CEDAW. These treaties cover an array of rights from political 
rights to civil rights and rights of women. ICCPR commits states to guarantee their 
citizens civil and political rights which include the right to life, freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, and electoral rights among many other rights. ICESCR commits 
states to ensure economic, social and cultural rights: right to education, labor rights, right 
11 
 
to health and various other rights. States which have ratified CEDAW, commit to 
guaranteeing women the right to gender equality, right to social security, right to work 
and so forth.   
Step 2: Which LDCs Ratified Human Rights Treaties? 
 Since five of the six the conventions were formulated in the 1960s (except 
CEDAW formulated in the 1970s) and entered into force in the 1970s (CEDAW in 
1981), I am only interested in least developed countries that were classified as such by 
the UN in the 1970s. Table 2.3 lists the reduced set of countries.  
Table 2.3: Least Developed Countries (1970s) and their Human Rights Treaties 












CAT    
1984  
CRC    
1989 
Ratified/Acceded 
to all six HRTs 
Afghanistan A A A R R R YES 
Bangladesh A A A R A R YES 
Benin R A A R A R YES 
Bhutan S   R  R NO 
Burkina 
Faso 
A A A A A R YES 




R A A A  R NO 
Chad A A A A A R YES 
Comoros R S S A S R NO 
Ethiopia A A A R A A YES 
Gambia A A A R S R NO 
Guinea R R R R R A YES 
Haiti R A A R S R NO 






















ed to all six 
HRTs 
Lesotho  A A A R A A Yes 
Malawi A A A A A A Yes 
Mali A A A R A R Yes 
Nepal A A A R A R Yes 
Niger R A A A A R Yes 
Rwanda A A A R A R  Yes 
Somalia R A A  A S No 
Sudan A A A  S R No 
Uganda A A A R  A No 
United Rep. 
of Tanzania 
A A A R  R No 
Yemen R A A A A R  Yes 
Zambia R A A R A R  Yes 
 
 
Source: UN Treaty Collection , “United Nations Treaty Collection,” Chapter IV: Human Rights, 
accessed November 20, 2014, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
 
Step 3: Reduced Sample Pool of Countries  
From the list of LDCs in Table 2.3, I found 17 least developed countries which 
have ratified all six core human rights treaties. Those countries are: Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Laos, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Yemen and Zambia. Of the six HRTs, I further 
reduced the sample pool by focusing on countries which delayed ratifying the three 
Key 
A= Accession                                        
S= Signed 
R= Ratified  
ICERD= International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
ICCPR= International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR= International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 
CEDAW= Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
CAT= Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
CRC= Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
13 
 
selected core treaties by ten years of more.  Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 reflect the further 
reduced list of countries and the date they ratified the three selected core human rights 
treaties: ICCPR, ICESCR and CEDAW.   
Table 2.4- Ratification of the ICCPR Adopted on December 16, 1966. Entry into 
force on March 23, 1976   
Least Developed Country Signed Ratified/ Acceded  
Bangladesh N.A. 9/2000a 
Benin N.A. 3/12/1992a 
Burkina Faso N.A. 1/4/1999a 
Burundi N.A. 5/9/1990a 
Chad N.A.  6/9/1995a 
Laos 12/7/2000 9/25/2009 
Lesotho N.A. 9/9/1992a 
Malawi N.A.     12/22/1993a 
Nepal N.A. 5/14/1991a 
Source: United Nations Treaty Collection: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 
Table 2.5: Ratification of the ICESCR Adopted on December 16, 1966 entry into 
force January 3, 1976  
Least Developed Countries Signed  Ratified/Acceded   
Afghanistan N.A. 1/24/1983a 
Bangladesh N.A. 10/5/1998a 
Benin N.A. 3/12/1992a 
Burkina Faso N.A. 1/4/1999a 
14 
 
Burundi N.A. 5/9/1990a 
Chad N.A. 6/9/1995a 
Laos 12/7/2000 2/13/2007a 
Lesotho N.A. 9/9/1992a 
Malawi N.A. 12/22/1993a 
Nepal N.A.  5/14/1991a 
Source: United Nations Treaty Collection International Covenant on Economic, Social and 




Table 2.6: Ratification of CEDAW Adopted on December 18, 1979. Entry into force 
September 3, 1981 
Least Developed Countries Signed Ratified/Acceded  
Afghanistan 8/14/1980 3/5/2003a 
Benin     11/11/1981 3/12/1992a 
Burundi 7/17/1980 1/8/1992a 
Chad  N.A. 6/9/1995a 
Gambia     7/29/1980     4/16/1993 
Lesotho 7/17/1980 8/22/1995 
Niger N.A. 10/8/1999a 
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 United Nations, “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 





The List of LDCs has now been further reduced to 9, 10 and 7, to reflect ratification 
delays in the ICCPR, ICESCR and CEDAW from the original list of 48 countries.  
Step 4: Final Choice 
 Benin, Burundi, Chad and Lesotho appear on all three lists. Those are four 
African countries and of those four I chose one, Lesotho. Chad and Benin suffered from 
various conflicts and military coups over the period I am looking at. Lesotho was, on the 
other hand, comparatively stable.  
 I also wanted to include an Asian country and even though none of the Asian 
countries had delayed ratifying all three human rights treaties, I decided to select 
countries which had delayed ratifying two. These countries were Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Laos and Nepal. Of these I chose Bangladesh as the largest, most democratic 
(despite many setbacks) country.  
 My case studies are therefore Lesotho and Bangladesh.  
Step 5: What Caused the Delay in Ratification?  
 
Before considering the reasons why my two states eventually ratified the HRTs I 
also wanted to explain what domestic circumstances caused them to delay. As I said 
earlier, three obstacles were identified: (a) political instability; (b) lack of economic and 
bureaucratic resources; and/or (c) cultural issues. With respect to (b), I should explain 
that when a treaty is ratified it also must be domesticated. Domestication is the process of 
internalizing and implementing legislation to give effect to a treaty. Once a country 
makes the decision to be legally bound to an HRT via ratification or accession, the next 
step is domestication. This step is usually the most difficult for countries, particularly 
LDCs, because the programs and institutions that are required to be established as part of 
16 
 
the treaty must be financially backed. Countries are also required to submit periodic 
reports to the respective treaty committee. These reports are designed to highlight the 
legislative and, judicial policies and other measures states have taken to implement the 
rights affirmed in the conventions they ratified. The ICCPR’s CCPR Committee requires 
states to submit their report within one year of ratifying the treaty and thereafter every 
five years. The ICESCR’s CESCR Committee requires states to submit their report 
within two years of ratification and thereafter every five years; and CEDAW requires 
states to submit within one year of ratification and every four years post- ratification. 
Since LDCs do not have quite as many resources as Advanced Developed Countries, it is 
more difficult for them to carry out such provisions.    
Step 6- Aid and Legitimacy as Reasons for Ratifying  
 After discussing the cause of delay for my two case studies, I will investigate 
what might have motivated Lesotho and Bangladesh to ratify after such a long time. I 
suggest the following two options as motives: (a) the prospect of retaining and 
maintaining the flow of aid, represented here as Official Development Aid (ODA); and/or 
(b) the prospect of gaining legitimacy in the international community. 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines ODA as flows to 
countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to multilateral 
development institutions.
18
 Flows are transfers of resources, either in cash or in the form 
of commodities or services. Each transaction made by the DAC is administered with the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
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objective. Least Developed Countries are included in the DAC along with upper, middle 
and low income countries. UN-administered or UN-approved peace operations are ODA 
eligible. Those activities and operations include: human rights, election monitoring, 
rehabilitation of demobilized soldiers and of national infrastructure and so forth.
19
 Social 
and cultural programs meet eligibility of ODA via the promotion of museums, libraries, 
art and music schools and sports training facilities and venues counts as ODA.
20
 Nuclear 
energy is ODA eligible provided it is for civilian purposes (i.e. nuclear safety and 
medical use of radioisotopes). Only research directly and primarily relevant to the 
problems of developing countries may be counted as ODA.
21
 Assistance to refugees is 
limited to the first 12 months of stay of when a refugee from a developing country arrives 
to a donor country. Also all costs associated with eventual repatriation to the developing 
country of origin are also ODA eligible. Military aid, civil police work, and anti-terrorism 
are excluded from receiving ODA.   
 Literature- Theoretical Perspectives  
Liberalism 
Liberalism is the school of thought that is most relevant to any discussion of 
human rights. It emphasizes interdependence between states and substate actors22 as the 
key characteristic of the international system.
23
 The core beliefs of liberalism consist of 








 Substate actors- actors within a state that interact with others outside the state, such as local 
businesses that import goods from abroad and provincial governments that establish trade mission 
in other countries. James Lee Ray and Juliet Kaarbo, Global Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2007), 9. 
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strengthening global economic ties, promoting international organizations and spreading 
democratic ideals. Since states are interdependent according to liberal theorists, their 
interests are intertwined and cooperation is likely. Liberals believe in the steady 
expansion of human freedom through various political strategies. According to 
liberalism, “[c]entral to the realization of greater human freedom is the growth of 
international cooperation. Cooperation is needed to maximize the possible benefits and 
minimize the possible damages of interactions and interdependence and to capture the 
opportunities for realizing greater peace, welfare and justice.”
24
 Liberals view 
cooperation as an ideal which is central to progress in human freedom. Although 
liberalism places great emphasis on interdependence and cooperation, it also focuses on 
the impact domestic politics have on state behavior.  
 Liberalism places great emphasis on international organizations. Liberals actively 
promote the rise of international organizations (IOs), particularly intergovernmental 
organizations in which states are members. International organizations such as the United 
Nations and the World Trade Organization facilitate cooperation, which liberals see as in 
the interests of states. International organizations help establish agreements and 
international law that can provide incentives for cooperation and organized, collective 
responses for punishing states that do not cooperate.
25
 Furthermore, international 
institutions can actually change a state’s interests by developing new norms of 
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international behavior, such as the respect for human rights and by developing 
mechanisms for cooperation, such as economic integration.26   
Liberalism is relevant to this thesis because it focuses on the importance of norms 
and on states’ coming together internationally in IOs to cooperate with one another to 
reach an agreement on human rights treaties (HRTs). Adherence to HRTs is dependent on 
interdependence and cooperation among states. The effectiveness of HRTs also depends 
on domestic cultural and political factors.  
Liberal theory argues that domestic interests shape states’ actions internationally, 
and that states ratify treaties when powerful domestic actors lobby for the cause.27 It 
follows that adherence to a treaty is achieved more quickly in states where domestic 
actors can express preferences to their governments. Ratification occurs more readily in 
democratic states because such states are more responsive to the preferences of domestic 
interest groups.28  
Countries join human rights treaties to reinforce domestic politics and reforms.29 
In addition, the decision to join human rights treaties is motivated by the expected 
payoffs of treaty membership.30 States are incentivized or driven by the expected payoffs 
they anticipate by joining the rest of the international community. By ratifying, states are 
entering an international community, creating closer ties in an attempt to avoid being 
ostracized for not ratifying. For instance, if a country lies in a region in which human 
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rights norms are highly valued, it will seek to demonstrate its commitment to these shared 
norms and thereby strengthen relations with other countries within the region—countries 
that because of their proximity, are more likely to engage with them in  trade and security 
alliances.31 Domestic politics and reforms in newly democratic countries impact 
ratification of human rights treaties because newly democratic countries seek to prevent 
autocratic backsliding. In countries where accountability mechanisms are weak, 
reformers bind themselves (and their successors) to external accountability systems such 
as treaty regimes. Human rights treaty membership therefore “locks in” liberal reforms 
by delegating authority and enforcement to international organizations.32  
Constructivism  
Constructivism proposes the most important aspects of global politics are socially 
“constructed” through systems of norms, beliefs, and discourse.33  Constructivists believe 
that international politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, norms, 
and social identities. In a sense, constructivists are more interested in understanding the 
subjective than the objective.34 Constructivism’s relevance to this thesis lies in the several 
important insights it gives into the process of ratification. A state ratifies a treaty in part 
because of its commitments to the norms or ideas that it embodies, so states must first 
have been persuaded by these norms.
35
 Countries join human rights treaties to affirm a 
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sincere commitment to treaty principles. According to norm-based approaches such as 
constructivism, countries support or oppose treaties purely on substantive grounds, and 
will join only those treaties that affirm their deep-seated normative, cultural, or 
ideological commitments.36 Genuine treaty commitments render provisions designed to 
enforce, coerce, or evade compliance unnecessary because “true believers” comply even 
in the absence of such measures.37 Countries that join human rights treaties are therefore 
expected to ratify without qualification regardless of the mechanisms established for 
monitoring and enforcing compliance.38  
For constructivists, state interests are formed through interactions with other 
states because social structures both constrain actors and enable them to develop their 
interests. According to norms scholar Martha Finnemore, “[s]ocially constructed rules, 
principles, norms of behavior, and shared beliefs may provide states, individuals, and 
other actors with an understanding of what is important or valuable and what are effective 
and/or legitimate means of obtaining those valued goods.”39 State interests are defined in 
the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and 
appropriate.40 Norms can be defined as a “broad class of prescriptive statements—rules, 
standards, principles, and so forth—both procedural and substantive” that are 
“prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense 
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that they ought to be followed.”41 Norms have a quality of “oughtness” that sets them 
apart from other kinds of rules. Norms are identified by regularities of behavior among 
actors. Norms reflect actual patterns of behavior and give rise to expectations as to what 
will in fact be done in a particular situation. On the other hand, norms reflect patterned 
behavior which gives rise to normative expectations as to what ought to be done.42 Thus 
regularity is combined with an internal attitude involving criticism of oneself or others on 
the ground that a particular norm is being violated.43 We recognize norm-breaking 
behavior because it generates disapproval or stigma.44  
States are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social 
relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world. States are 
socialized to want certain things by the international society in which they and the people 
in them live.45 States are socialized to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of 
interest by international organizations.46 These transnational networks, are important 
influences on state behavior because a state’s interest changes as the interests of its 
neighboring states change. In this vein, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue 
that a “norm cascade” results when states’ behavior reaches a tipping point, persuading 
reluctant states to adopt a new norm created by the majority. Once states have adopted a 
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norm, other states will be motivated by a desire to enhance their legitimacy, reputation, 
and esteem by also adopting the norm.47  
Constructivist scholars such as Finnemore, Sikkink, Risse and various others 
emphasize the ways in which international organizations can socialize or teach states to 
accept the goals and values embedded in international law. Drawing on their key 
assumptions that state interests are defined in a context of internationally held norms—
norms that are often embedded by international law and carried by governmental as well 
as nongovernmental actors—constructivists have argued that states comply with 
international law when government elites learn to accept and incorporate shared norms 
and values that structure international political life.48 International organizations not only 
constrain states’ behavior through legal sanctions applied to international law, they also 
socialize states to accept new norms and values, such as the human rights enshrined in 
international law today.49  
Human Rights Treaty Ratification  
The notion of a least developing country ratifying a treaty in order to receive aid 
and legitimacy (though legitimacy is an argument that applies to other states as well) is 
supported by human rights scholars such as Hathaway, Posner, Hafner-Burton, Magesan 
and several others who have researched and conducted studies in an attempt to determine 
the link between aid, legitimacy and HRTs.    
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Oona Hathaway examines why states decide to ratify HRTs, and concludes that 
countries ratify treaties in order to obtain collateral incentives, which are the incentives 
created by collateral effects. States ratify to make themselves look good to developed 
countries. By doing so, they hope to attract foreign investment, aid donations, 
international trade, and other tangible benefits.
50
 
Magesan constructs a dynamic game of treaty ratification, known as a game of 
oligopoly competition where firms invest in quality. Here aid receiving countries 
compete to attract economic resources from the developed world by ratifying costly 
human rights treaties.
51
 He believes donor countries make resource allocation decisions 
based on the relative treaty participation of recipient countries.
52
 In his research he 
establishes that aid donors reward countries that participate more frequently in HRTs: 
countries that ratify HRTs more frequently than other aid recipients experience an 
increase in foreign aid receipts.
53
 The decision to donate aid to HRT participants is 
consistent with rational donors having positive preferences for human rights conditions in 
recipient countries. Therefore, countries that participate in HRTs receive more foreign aid 
than countries that do not. He concludes that there is indeed a linkage between aid and 
HRTs’ ratification. He states that when there is a 10 percent decline in aid as an incentive 
to ratify, then there is 33 percent less chance the state will ratify the treaty.
54
 In 
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comparison, when human rights is used as the sole motive without the use of incentives 
to persuade states to  ratify a treaty, there are hardly any changes to ratification behavior. 
Posner’s position is different from the rest of the human rights scholars. He is 
more concerned with human rights effectiveness in constraining states and his research 
dwells more on the attention that should be given to human welfare and not human rights. 
His explanation as to why developing countries ratify is that this is due to international 
pressure from the West (developed nations). According to Posner, some developing 
countries, “[s]uccumb to pressure from Western states that tie aid and other benefits (such 
as EU membership) to treaty ratification.”55 The aid given to developing countries is 
significant and is intended to improve the well-being of the poor, but much of it is 
designed to serve strategic or political interests of the donor. Posner recalls, “[a]t one 
time, donor nations did not expect that recipient nations would necessarily comply with 
HRTs, but in recent years there has emerged a norm of ‘rights-based development’ that 
insists that aid must be sensitive to the human rights practices of the recipient state.”56  
Posner introduces a third party that influences ratification, international 
organizations (IOs).  He believes international organizations like the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund encourage recipients of aid to improve their human rights 
record. Posner finds support from norm scholars such as Risse, Ropp and Sikkink.  They 
are interested in the conditions under which HR regimes and the principles, norms and 
rules embedded in them are internalized and implemented domestically.57 Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink find that developed countries and IOs apply pressure to states to ratify in 
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exchange for aid. They state, “[w]ith regard to Third World countries, one could assume 
that human rights conditions improve resulting from pressures by the World Bank and/or 
donor countries employing good governance criteria. State actors in Third World 
countries might enact liberalizing measures in order to get financial and economic 
development aid from the West or from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).”58 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui examine the impact of the international human rights 
regime on government human rights practices. They propose an explanation that 
highlights a “paradox of empty promises.”59Their arguments are that governments often 
ratify human rights treaties as a form of window dressing and human rights advocates 
leverage legitimacy as a global norm of appropriate state behavior, thus pressuring states 
to improve their human rights practices. In conducting their research they find that the 
decision to ratify by developing countries is a “symbolic gesture to signal that the 
government is not a deviant actor,” and does not necessarily lead to compliant practices 
with the treaty.60 In other words, ruling elites might ratify a treaty to gain legitimation in 
international society, putting little effort into aligning their behavior with the treaty 
provisions.61 Legitimacy is an intangible benefit valued in the international community. A 
legitimate state is viewed as authentic and capable of handling issues that may arise 
within its borders.  
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 Many scholars including Finnemore have focused on the “logic of 
appropriateness,” in which states adopt international norms because they become 
convinced that such behavior is appropriate for any actor claiming statehood.62 In this 
view, norms become constitutive of statehood such that states routinely adopt them as 
part and parcel of their identities as states. Sociologists adopting a world society approach 
argue in a similar vein that institutional forms spread throughout states because they are 
legitimized internationally as part of what it means to be a state.63  
Hafner et al research the rationale behind repressive regimes ratifying HRTs and 
conclude that legitimacy, among numerous other factors, influences ratification. 
According to them, “[t]he subscribing sovereign gains, or claims, legitimacy in the eyes 
of superior sovereigns, peers, internal and external competitors, and internal subordinate 
groups and interests. This clearly helps explain why, as we show below, very large 
numbers of nation-states ratify human rights treaties -- far beyond those few states that 
have some prospect of effectively implementing these treaties in practice.”
64
 
These scholars have contributed tremendously to the literature on human rights 
treaties.  In the next few chapters, I seek to add to the literature by investigating whether 
there is a correlation between ratification and economic aid/legitimacy by taking a deeper 
look at two countries. But first in Chapter 3 I will take a closer look at the performance of 
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all LDCs and in particular the 17 LDCs (Table 2.3) which ratified all six treaties. This 
chapter will provide a general understanding of these LDCs and their attitudes toward 




















Chapter 3- Least Developed Countries  
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) represent the poorest and weakest 
segment of the international community.
1
 Their low level of socio-economic 
development is accompanied by weak human and institutional capacities, low and 
unequally distributed income and scarcity of domestic financial resources.
2
 They often 
suffer from governance crises and internal and external conflicts. In this chapter I will 
provide an overview of LDCs performance in ratifying the core human rights treaties 
(HRTs). Aside from lack of economic resources, LDCs share similar political, social and 
cultural characteristics, which shape their identity as least developed. Those 
characteristics will be closely examined to provide a better understanding of least 
developed countries.   
Africa 
As previously mentioned, the majority of LDCs are located within the African 
continent. Twenty-two of the 34 African LDCs ratified the six human rights treaties 
(HRTs). The African states share similar societal and cultural values, turbulence in their 
political histories, and experience similar issues in the area of human rights.  
In the mid to late 19
th
 Century, the European powers colonized much of Africa 
and Southeast Asia. During the decades of imperialism, the industrializing powers of 
Europe viewed the African and Asian continents as reservoirs of raw materials, labor and 
territory for future settlement.  
                                                          
1
 "About LDCs A Propos Des Pays Les Moins Avancés - UN-OHRLLS." UN Office of the High 
Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small 
Island Developing States.  Accessed November 19, 2014. http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/. 
2
 “About LDCsA Propos Des Pays Les Moins Avancés.” 
30 
 
The 1960s was a critical decade for Africa. The majority of the states obtained 
their independence from their European colonial rulers: France, Belgium, Spain, and 
United Kingdom. A few newly independent countries acquired stable governments 
almost immediately; others were ruled by dictators or military juntas for years or endured 
long civil wars.
3
 A trend among these newly independent states is that approximately 
within 15 years of independence they were inducted into the Committee for Development 
Policy (CDP) list of least developed countries. 
 The colonial powers drew arbitrary natural boundaries where none had existed 
before, dividing ethnic and linguistic groups and laying the foundation for the creation of 
numerous states lacking geographic, linguistic, ethnic, and political affinity. Once they 
gained their independence there was no established infrastructure for the new nations to 
follow and their colonial rulers were no longer supporting the states. Thus the new 
nations had difficulties establishing stable government. As mentioned before, some were 
able to establish stable government but the majority experienced authoritarian regimes or 
military government. Many new nations endured civil conflict and patrimonial regimes 
post- independence. Patrimonialism is a form of political domination, in which authority 
rests on the personal and bureaucratic power exercised by a royal household, where that 
power is formally arbitrary and under the direct control of the ruler.
4
 For instance, the 
president of former Zaire, present day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mobutu 
Sese Seko ruled the Congo under a patrimonial style. Two years into office, Mobutu 
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consolidated his rule and proceeded to give the country a new constitution and a single 
party.
5
 Under the new constitution executive powers were centralized in the office of the 
president who would be the head of state, head of government, commander in chief of the 
armed forces and the police, and in charge of foreign policy. Mobutu would reign over 
Zaire for the next 30 years (1965-1997).  
 In addition, African nations became independent during the era of East-West 
conflict and many African countries adopted socialist regimes. For instance, Benin 
obtained its independence in 1960 and for the next 12 years it endured several coups and 
regime changes. In 1972, the new leader of Benin Lt. Col Mathieu Kerekou declared the 
country Marxist-Leninist, garnering support from the Eastern bloc. This regime lasted 
until 1989, just after the collapse of the USSR. In 1990, the country began the 
democratization process by holding multi-candidate presidential elections. Once Benin 
transitioned into a democratic state it ratified human rights treaties.  
Despite the collapse of the Eastern bloc and end of the Cold War, the problems in 
Africa have intensified with respect to civil rights. African states are still experiencing 
civil conflict and the democratization process is a difficult transition for some. If you 
look at Table 3.1, under the Freedom House rating there is a ‘not free’ or ‘partially free 
rating for many African states. As can be seen many states are still not free because they 
violate civil and political rights.  
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Table 3.1- African Least Developed Countries  








Benin* 1960 1971 Free           Christianity 
Burkina Faso  1960 1971 Partially 
Free 
Islam 
Burundi** 1962 1971 Partially 
Free 
Christianity 
Chad ** 1960 1971 Not Free Islam 
Table 3.1 Continued      
DRC** 1960 1971 Not Free Christianity 
Djibouti 1977 1982 Not Free Islam 
Equatorial Guinea 1968 1982 Not Free Christianity 
Eritrea 1968 1994 Not Free Islam 
Ethiopia*   1971 Not Free Ethiopian Orthodox 
Guinea 1958 1971 Partially 
Free 
Islam 
Guinea- Bissau* 1973 1981 Not Free Islam 
Liberia 1847 1990 Partially 
Free 
Christianity 
Madagascar*  1960 1991 Partially 
Free 
Indigenous beliefs 
Malawi 1964 1971 Partially 
Free 
Christianity  
Mali*/** 1960 1971 Partially 
Free 
Islam 
Mauritania  1960 1986 Not Free Islam 
Niger 1960 1971 Partially 
Free 
Islam 
Rwanda** 1962 1971 Not Free Roman Catholic 
Senegal  1960 2000 Free Islam 
Sierra Leone  1961 1982 Partially 
Free 
Islam 
Togo 1960 1982 Partially 
Free  
Indigenous beliefs 





*= Former Socialist country 
**= Child solider recruitment is a problem in these countries 
Freedom House Rating system is to be defined as follows:   
Free means a country or territory which enjoys a wide array of political and civil liberties; 
the political liberties include free and fair elections; civil liberties are freedom of 
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expression, assembly, association, education and religion.  
Partially Free countries moderately protect almost all political and civil rights or strongly 
protect some political and civil rights while neglecting others. Countries which are 
considered 
Not Free have few or no political and civil rights because of severe government 
oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. These countries allow virtually no 
freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners. 
 
Today African LDCs are still caught in a never ending cycle between democracy 
and one party rule. With such instability, citizens’ civil and political rights are not 
respected and at times states are not considered fully free. An example of this volatility 
and its effect on civil rights is the serious concern over the recruitment of child soldiers 
within the continent. Recruitment has occurred in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Chad, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Mali. For example, the Eastern part of the 
DRC has been torn by conflict since 1996 and in 2012 the situation intensified. The M23, 
a Rwandan backed armed group which has committed widespread war crimes has been 
actively recruiting Congolese children. The UN documented 910 children (783 boys and 
127 girls), who have been newly recruited and used by armed groups.
6
 Almost half of the 
children were reportedly used as combatants, informants, carriers and other support roles. 
Most of the girls were subjected to sexual slavery.
7
 In the 2014 Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR)
8
, the Secretary General noted, “An alarming number of reports of grave 
violations of children’s rights were documented, including killing and maimed child 
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recruitment, sexual violence and occupation of schools.”
9
 The Secretary-General 
addressed to the Security Council in May 15, 2013:  
The resurgence of conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo following the 
creation of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) in April 2012 resulted in a marked increase 
in the number of grave violations against children.  M23 is responsible for systematic 
recruitment and use of children. A total of 65 boys between 13 and 17 years of age, 
including 25 who claimed to be Rwandan, escaped or surrendered from M23 between 
April and December 2012. A total of those boys 21, (18 Rwandan and 3 Congolese) 
stated they were recruited on Rwandan territory to fight in the DRC. Testimonies from 
former M23 combatants suggested that hundreds of children remained in M23. As a 
direct result of conflict-related violence, 154 children (86 boys and 64 girls) were killed 
and 113 (76 boys and 35 girls) were injured in 2012. The report continues to discuss 
incidents that were sparked by M23 including cases of rape and other forms of sexual 
violence performed on children. In 2012, 5,584 children associated with armed forces and 
armed groups received support from the United Nations, as did 5,022 child victims of 
sexual violence. While the efforts of the government to cease underage recruitment are 
commendable, the lack of accountability for perpetrators of grave violations against 
children remains of concern. More has to be done to ensure that adult perpetrators are 
duly prosecuted. Of the 185 cases of rape and sexual violence against children by 
government security forces documented in 2012, only 40 alleged perpetrators were 




Socio-Economic Rights  
In addition to the civil and political human rights issues, the people of the 
continent are suffering from violations of socio-economic rights. Table 3.2 demonstrates 
the correlation between human development and the economic status of the African 
LDCs. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in order to be classified as an LDC, the country must 
have a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of $992 and under. For some countries 
like Burundi a GNI per capita of $992 is unattainable; the country has a GNI per capita of 
$280 in 2013 (the highest GNI it has ever experienced; it has been on the CDP list of 
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LDCs since 1971 but has yet to surpass $992. Although it has ratified all six human rights 
treaties its HDI is one of the lowest. Its citizens are experiencing a low quality of life and 
are barely receiving their basic necessities. Equatorial Guinea is an exception to the rule 
that LDCs have a low per capita income. Its GNI per capita for 2013 was $14,320.  
Equatorial Guinea was inducted into the CDP list of LDCs in 1982. In the last past 
decade it has experienced rapid economic growth due the discovery of large offshore oil 
reserves.
11
 This rapid economic growth has garnered approval for the country to graduate 
from the list of LDCs. On December 4, 2013, the General Assembly endorsed the 
recommendation of the CDP and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to graduate in 
3 ½ years. Nevertheless, Equatorial Guinea citizens’ suffer from low human 
development, placing 144 on the 2014 Human Development Index.  
In education, the expected years of schooling for Burundi citizens’ are 10.1 
years.
12
 The human development index defines years of schooling as the number of years 
a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age specific 
enrollment rates persist throughout the child’s life.
13
 Equatorial Guinea has an expect 
years of schooling of 8.5 years. The life expectancy in Equatorial Guinea the life 
expectancy at birth is 53 years compared to Burundi 54.
14
 There are several factors 
involved when accounting for quality of life but for the most part African states’ 
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economic hardships are getting in the way of providing for better human development 
within their borders.  
Table 3.2- Socio-Economic Status of African States  








Benin # $790 165 
Burkina Faso # $670 181 
Burundi $280 180 
Chad# $1,020 184 
DRC $400 186 
Djibouti # N.A. 170 
Equatorial Guinea $14,320* 144 
Eritrea # $490 182 
Ethiopia # $470 173 
Guinea # $460 179 
Guinea-Bissau # $520 177 
Liberia # $410 175 
Madagascar $440 155 
Malawi $270 174 
Mali # $670 176 
Mauritania # $1,060 161 
Niger # $410 187 
Rwanda $620 151 
Senegal # $1,070 163 
Sierra Leone # $680 183 
Togo # $530 166 
Zambia $820 141 
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Source: 2014 Human Development Report & 2013 World Bank  
#= Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is practiced 
*= Equatorial Guinea will be graduating from the CDP list of LDCs in 3 ½ years (approximately 
by 2017) 
 
Africa is home to several of the world’s worse performing countries in terms of 
respect for human rights.
17
 The majority of African states commit societal abuses 
targeting women, children and the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender community. 
Violence against women, sexual exploitation and human trafficking are relatively 
common.  Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) occurs in some countries and 
recognized internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), it reflects deep-rooted inequality 
between the sexes, and constitutes an extreme form of discrimination against women. 
FGM/C is practiced in 29 countries in Africa and the Middle East, 15 of which are 
included in Table 3.2.  The causes of female genital mutilation include a mix of cultural, 
religious and social factors within families and communities.
18
 Where FGM/C is a social 
convention, the social pressure to conform to what others do and have been doing is a 
strong motivation to perpetuate the practice. FGM/C is associated with cultural ideals of 
femininity and modesty. In most societies, FGM/C is considered a cultural tradition, 
which is often used as an argument for its continuation. Eleven of the 15 countries are 
predominantly Islamic states; though no religious scripts prohibit the practice, 
practitioners often believe the practice has religious support. Despite no religion 
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condoning the practice, it is worth noting that there is a correlation between Islamic states 
and FGM practices. For instance, 96 percent which is 6.5 million of Guinea’s girl and 
women population have been affected by the practice of FGM/C. Despite the practice 
being banned in the 1960s and still considered illegal today, Guinea’s Office for the 
Protection of Gender, Children and Morals (OPROGEM) Special Police Unit prosecuted 
only one case of FGM/C in 2013.
19
  Guinea’s persistent practice of FGM/C is a major 
violation to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), a Convention which Guinea signed in 1980 and ratified two years 
later in 1982. Seeing that the country ratified all six human rights treaties, it is 
disheartening that it is experiencing such difficulty eradicating a practice that is 
detrimental to the rights of girls and women. Guinea is not alone in the practice and the 
following are the remaining top four countries with the highest percentage of girls and 
women aged 15 to 49 years who have undergone FGM/C: Djibouti 93%, Mali 89%, 
Sierra Leone 88%, and Burkina Faso 76%, and the remaining Islamic states in Table 3.2.  
Asia-Pacific 
There are far fewer LDCs in Asia Pacific and their ranking in the Human 
Development Index (HDI) is generally higher. Despite those variations, in the Asia- 
Pacific region there are also states which violate political and civil rights, and in 
particular the rights of women and children. Today the majority of these countries are not 
free and there are restrictions on basic freedoms (speech and assembly), accusations of 
cruel inhuman treatment against detainees, arbitrary arrests, and unlawful killings of 
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opposition candidates. In the area of women and children rights, in countries including 
Afghanistan, Cambodia and Yemen women and children endure sexual based violence, 
underage and forced marriages, trafficking in persons, and sex and labor trafficking. 
Table 3.3: Least Developed Countries in Asia-Pacific  




Freedom Main Religion  
Afghanistan */** 1919 1971 Not Free Sunni Muslim 
Cambodia 1953 1991 Not Free Buddhist 
Laos   1953 1971 Not Free Buddhist 
Nepal 1768 1971 Partially Free Hindu 
Timor-Leste 2002 2003 N.A. Roman Catholic 
Yemen **  1967 1971 Not Free Islam 
     
Source: 
1
 Freedom House, “Asia-Pacific,” accessed December 4, 2014, 
https://freedomhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific#.VICjycm9bgV. 
Key: 
*= Former Socialist country 
**= Child Soldier recruitment is an issue in those countries 
 Like African states, Asian-Pacific countries also endured authoritarian, socialist 
and one- party rule governments. These forms of regimes may influence a country’s 
attitude towards human rights. For instance Laos, is one of the world’s few remaining 
communist states.
20
 This country is an extreme case of violations of human rights. 
According to Freedom House ranking, Laos Freedom Rating is 6.5 (1=best, 7= worst); 
civil liberties 6 and political liberties 7. The country’s 1991 constitution makes the Laos 
People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) the sole legal political party and grants it a leading 
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role at all levels of government.
21
 As previously mentioned, the lack of respect for its 
citizens’ civil and political rights derives from its governing style. The U.S. State 
Department Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 2013 Laos stated, “Among the 
most significant human rights problems continued to be that the government denied the 
right to change their government, infringements on freedom of speech, press assembly 
and association.”
22
 In order for more freedoms to be granted a change of government 
must take place. Unless the critical step of transitioning governments is taken, Laotians 
will continue to endure infringement on their civil and political rights.  
  Yemen is an example of a country where civil conflict has escalated to the extent 
of recruiting child soldiers. Armed conflict involving Houthi-aligned forces persists in the 
north and between the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) and al- Qa’ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula in the south of the country.
23
 Children in Yemen are vulnerable to recruitment 
and engagement in ongoing armed conflicts.
24
 During the reporting period, 106 children 
were reported to be recruited, all boys between 6 and 17 years of age.
25
 While a 1991 law 
prohibits the use of child soldiers, the YAF, many tribal militias and al Qa’ida in the 
Arabian Peninsula, among various other groups, continue to have children in their ranks. 
Family members, military officers and local sheiks facilitate the recruitment of children 
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for the YAF through the means of false identification and birth certificates.
26
 The Yemini 
government is not doing enough to prevent recruitment from occurring.  The government 
does not appear to have any disarmament, demobilization, or reintegration programs for 
children affected by armed conflict.   
 Laos serves to demonstrate the manner in which a form of government may 
infringe the civil and political rights of its citizens, while Yemen serves as an example of 
how civil conflict may be used to recruit child soldiers.  
Socio-Economic Rights  
As mentioned earlier, there is a correlation between economic and social 
development. There is a noticeable increase in GNI for Asian-Pacific countries compared 
to African states. This increase in GNI can be equated with higher social development but 
unfortunately it is not the case for the majority of states. Cambodia and Yemen will be 
examined in regards to women and children’s rights. 
Table 3.4: Socio-Economic status of Asia-Pacific 
 LDCs Gross National Income per 
capita for 2013 
Human Development Index 
2014 
Afghanistan  $700 169 
Cambodia $950 136 
Laos   $1,460 139 
Nepal $730 145 
Timor-Leste $3,580 128 
Yemen # $1,330 154 
Source: Khalid Malik, United Nations Development Programme, and Human Development 
Report Office, Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vunerabilities and Building Resilience, 
2014, p. 162 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf.  





As can be noted from Table 3.4, Cambodia has a GNI per capita of $950 and 
placed 136
th
 in the human development index. Despite its “low” placement and moderate 
GNI (for an LDC), there are several problems in regards to women and children’s rights. 
Cambodia has a traditional society, which is a factor in children’s rights specifically in 
rural areas. Within these traditional structures children are not seen as having rights but 
responsibilities.
27
 In a 2012 survey conducted by the government called the Cambodia 
Labor Force and Child Labor Survey, data indicated that more than half of child laborers 
ages 5-17 were engaged in agriculture, forestry and the fishing sector.
28
 Children in rural 
areas are more susceptible to child labor than children in urban areas due to the 
prevalence of rural poverty and lack of educational opportunities. Despite creating 
legislation establishing a minimum age for employment, rural families rely on the 
additional income that derives from their child’s labor.
29
  
Cambodian women suffer widespread economic and social discrimination. Only 
9.9 percent of the female population has obtained a secondary education compared to 
22.2 percent for males.
30
 Rape and violence against women is common. The 2013 U.S. 
State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices stated, “There likely was 
underreporting on the problem of rape and domestic violence because of inadequate 
crime statistics reporting women’s fear of reprisal by perpetrators. NGOs reported 
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The U.S. State Department 2014 Human Trafficking Report classifies Yemen as a 
Tier 3 country. Tier 3 countries do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are 
not making significant efforts to do so.
32
  The report describes Yemen as a, “country of 
origin and, to a lesser extent, a transit and destination country for men, women, and 
children subjected to forced labor, and women and children subjected to sex 
trafficking.”
33
  The Yemeni government and international NGOs estimate that there are 
approximately 1.7 million laborers under the age of 14 in Yemen, some of whom are 
subjected to forced labor.
34
 A factor that encourages impoverished Yemeni families is 
that often children are paid the same wages as adults. A serious concern aside from 
forced labor is sex trafficking and forced marriages in the country. Yemini girls, some as 
young as 15 years-old, are subjected to sex trafficking within the country and in Saudi 
Arabia. There is no criminal law that prohibits foreign tourists from sexually exploiting 
children and adults in Yemen.  The trafficking law is not fully comprehensive, and only 
narrowly focuses on transactions and movement of humans internationally. There are no 
provisions for children trafficked domestically. As for forced marriages, there is no 
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minimum age for marriage in Yemen, and there is evidence that girls as young as eight 
are forced into marriage.
35
 
In the area of women’s rights, Yemeni women continue to face discrimination in 
several aspects of life.
36
 For instance, a woman must obtain permission from her husband 
or father to receive a passport and travel abroad. This behavior goes against Article 5(a) 
of CEDAW, 
 To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are 
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women.
37
  
   
Women are vastly underrepresented in government; there is only one woman in 
the lower house of parliament in 2013.
38
 In education, school enrollment of girls falls far 
that of boys.
39
 The Yemeni female population with a secondary education is 7.6 percent 
compared to 24 percent for males.
40
  
Overall, LDCs in both the regions experienced and continue to experience 
violations in the areas of civil, political, and socio-economic rights. It must be noted that 
all the countries which were cited as examples of violating rights actually ratified all six 
human rights treaties. This brings the question, if such gross violations are occurring to 
the citizens of these countries, what made them ratify all six HRTs? In the chapters to 
come I will attempt to address this question. Using Lesotho and Bangladesh as my case 
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studies I will delve into what caused their delay in ratification and what influenced them 
to ratify the treaties eventually. Like the countries mentioned in this chapter, they are 
























Chapter 4- Lesotho 
Background 
Lesotho is an example of a Least Developed Country that has signed on to human 
rights treaties but has experienced a delay of ten years or more in acceding/ratifying 
human rights treaties. Based on my hypothesis then, Lesotho probably experienced on or 
all of the following obstacles to justify such a delay: (a) political instability; (b) lack of 
economic and bureaucratic resources; (c) cultural concerns. Once it decided to ratify, I 
propose, it probably did so for reasons of economic aid and/ or legitimacy.  
Lesotho, officially named the Kingdom of Lesotho is located in the Southern part 
of Africa. Lesotho represents the southernmost landlocked country in the world and has 
an area of 30,355 square kilometers. Its population was expected to reach 1,942,008 by 
July of 2014.
1
  Lesotho is considered a Least Developed Country and has been on the 
Committee for Development Policy (CDP) list since 1971.  With a gross national income 
per capita (GNI) of $1,380, the Kingdom of Lesotho has a higher GNI than some of the 
LDCs on the UN’s list.  
Political History 
The Kingdom of Lesotho, formerly known as Basutoland, was a former British 
protectorate. Lesotho has had a turbulent, if not particularly bloody, period after 
independence with several parties, army factions and the royal family competing for 
power in coups and mutinies.2 It gained independence from Britain on October 4, 1966.  
                                                          
1
 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook 13-14: Lesotho,” 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lt.html. 
2




Moshoeshoe II became king and Chief Leabua Jonathan, a member of the Basotho 
National Party (BNP), became prime minister of Basutoland.  
The BNP ruled from 1966 until 1970. In the first election post- independence held 
in January of 1970, Leabua Jonathan, then the acting Prime Minister, ran against the BCP 
candidate, Ntsu Mokhehle.  The BCP won in a landslide victory but the BNP was not 
ready to relinquish power. Jonathan declared a state of emergency, suspended the 
constitution, instituted a de facto party system with no regular elections, imprisoned 
various opponents, and exiled the king.3 Jonathan’s decision to remain in power caused 
great political instability: riots ensued and a guerilla wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army, 
was created by the BCP. The BNP would remain in power for the next 16 years (1970-
1986). Jonathan resorted to iron rule politics anchored in the police and the paramilitary 
forces he had created to keep vigilance over the population. Under Jonathan, there was a 
major escalation of coercion and a glaring setback for human rights.4 The majority of 
deaths and atrocities, numbering in the hundreds rather than the tens, occurred during the 
period of resistance immediately following Chief Jonathan’s decision to retain power. 
Ironically, despite the human rights violations occurring within the country Jonathan was 
an outspoken critic of apartheid South Africa, a stance which garnered him favor with the 
international community.5  
By the early 1980s, opposition was building against Jonathan and the BNP. There 
was renewed hostility when Jonathan permitted China, the then Soviet Union and North 
Korea to open embassies in Lesotho in 1982. In 1986, a military coup led by Major-
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General Justin Lekhanya deposed the BNP government in a bloodless coup. The military 
government governed Lesotho for the next seven years (1986-1993). During this period 
the military government ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR in 1992. The Military Council 
reinstated King Moshoeshoe II as head of state, granting him executive powers (the king 
up until then was a ceremonial monarch). In February 1990, conflict arose within the 
Military Council. King Moshoeshoe wrote a memorandum requesting more executive 
powers than what was already granted to him by the Military Council. Subsequently, 
King Moshoeshoe was dethroned and went into exile, and his son King Letsie III was 
installed as the head of state.  In April 1991 Maj. Lekhanya, the chairman of the Military 
Council, was deposed by a coup led by Col. Elias Tutsoane Rameama. Rameama lifted 
the ban on political activity and promised a new constitution.6  In March 1993, the first 
democratic elections since 1970 were held and the BCP was voted into power. Ntsu 
Mokhehle became Prime Minister under the BCP. Once a new democratic government 
took office, King Letsie III tried unsuccessfully to persuade the BCP to reinstate King 
Moshoeshoe as head of state.    
In August of 1994, another military coup led by King Letsie III, deposed the BCP 
administration. The displacement of the BCP only lasted a month; in September of 1994 
the BCP was reinstated and King Moshoeshoe II was allowed to return as king. 
Unfortunately, in January 1996 King Moshoeshoe was killed in an accident and King 
Letsie was restored as king.  
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During this period (1994-1996), Lesotho experienced economic pressures. The 
country was heavily affected by the Apartheid regime in South Africa and its own 
political turmoil. When international donors removed economic sanctions against South 
Africa, Lesotho was negatively impacted; its economy declined because its competitor 
was no longer economically isolated.7 Lesotho had enjoyed the advantage of being close 
to South Africa, a target of economic sanctions. In conjunction with the removal of 
sanctions, South Africa reduced the demand for Sotho laborers, which consequently 
increased unemployment and underemployment and increased the political instability 
within the country.8 As a result, Prime Minister Mokhehle, the leader at the time, was 
dismissed. Mokhehle went on to form his own political party, the Lesotho Congress of 
Democrats (LCD). LCD won the general elections in 1998, but the victory caused 
protests and riots by the opposition. With the assistance of the international community, 
troops were sent in to handle the country’s unrest. A solution to the constant opposition to 
the victory of rival parties was the implementation of a new electoral system, the Mixed 
Proportional System. This system was used in the 2002 elections to ensure fair and equal 
representation of parties. However, the opposition deemed the results fraudulent, despite 
the polls being monitored by international observers. This turbulence continued for 
several years.  
Today, Lesotho is still a constitutional monarchy with King Letsie III serving as 
ceremonial head of state.  The lower house of Parliament, the National Assembly, is 
comprised of 120 seats; 80 seats are filled through first past-the-post constituency votes 







and 40 through proportional representation.9 Members serve five-year terms, and the 
leader of the majority party becomes the prime minister.10 The Senate, the upper house of 
Parliament, consists of Lesotho’s 22 traditional principal chiefs.11 
Human Rights Issues 
Table 4.1: Ratification of Human Rights Treaties by Lesotho (1966) 
Core Human Rights Treaties Date of Signature Date of Ratification, 
accession or succession  
ICERD (1966)  November 4,1971a 
ICESCR  (1966)  September 9, 1992a 
ICCPR  (1966)  September 9,1992a  
CEDAW (1979) July 17, 1980 August 22, 1995 
CAT (1984)  November 12, 2001a 
CRC (1989) Aug. 21, 1990 March 10, 1992 
   
Source:  Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Compilation Prepared by the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Accordance with Paragraph 15(b) of the Annex 
to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Lesotho, Universal Periodic Review (United Nations 
General Assembly: United Nations, February 19, 2010), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/LSSession21.aspx 
 
Despite Lesotho’s tumultuous political history, it has ratified all of the six core 
human rights treaties: ICERD, ICESCR, ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT and CRC. Nevertheless, 
Lesotho’s human rights record requires improvement. The country has various human 
rights issues, which include societal abuse of women and children, the stigmatization of 
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persons with disabilities, human trafficking, discrimination against persons with 
HIV/AIDS and the persistence of child labor.  
As demonstrated by Table 4.1, Lesotho has made the commitment to be legally 
bound by these HRTs. Human rights are guaranteed under Chapter 2 of Lesotho’s 
constitution. It covers fundamental human rights and freedoms ranging from right to life 
to the right to participate in government. Although the rights of its citizens are 
guaranteed, there are difficulties in the creation of legislation and implementation of 
these rights. Lesotho has a dual legal system- Roman Dutch Law (common law) and 
Basotho customs (customary law). These two systems of law have equal validity with the 
proviso that in cases of inconsistency, statutory law prevails.12 However, the two systems 
cannot be applied simultaneously in a given situation.13  Lesotho’s legal duality poses a 
serious problem for the domestication of a HRTs, because this duality creates a 
contradiction, thus making the creation of legislation a difficult process. 
In spite of Lesotho’s human rights challenges and conflicting legal duality, the 
UN reports that it is working towards improving its performance in the area of human 
rights. For instance, Lesotho is attempting to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). It is currently on track to achieving the gender equality and women’s 
empowerment targets of Goal 3.14 It is also on track to achieving Goal 2 targets on 
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education.15  I selected CEDAW, ICCPR and ICESCR to highlight some of Lesotho’s 
improvements as well as challenges in the area of women’s rights, socio-economic rights, 
and civil/ political rights.   
  CEDAW 
Lesotho ratified CEDAW on August 22, 1995. CEDAW’s 30 articles are said to 
provide a blueprint to promote basic human rights, achieve progress and overcome 
barriers of discrimination against women and girls, while recognizing that it is up to each 
country to determine how best to bring their policies and laws in line with ending 
discrimination against women.16 Lesotho’s constitution and law prohibit discrimination 
based on race, gender, disability, language, or social status. The constitution recognizes 
customary law as a parallel legal system, however, under which women remain 
disadvantaged with regard to property rights, inheritance, and succession rights.17 The 
following are the forms of violations the women of Lesotho face: discrimination, rape 
and domestic violence, sexual harassment, violations of reproductive rights and harmful 
traditional practices.   
Rape 
The law criminalizes rape including spousal rape and domestic violence. When 
cases are reported, authorities are said to enforce the law promptly. However, sexual 
assault and rape are often not reported. Domestic violence against women is widespread 
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and under reported. Since it is under reported very few cases are brought to trial.18 
Categorizing the type of domestic violence used to charge offenders is very vague and 
therefore judges convict offenders at their own discretion.19   
Sexual Harassment 
  The Law criminalizes sexual harassment, indecent exposure and sexual assault.20 
Victims rarely reported sexual harassment. According to the registrar of the Labor Court, 
only one case has been reported since 2002 and the plaintiff’s lawyer withdrew that 
case.21 
Discrimination 
Men and women enjoy equal rights in civil and criminal courts. The law prohibits 
discrimination against women under formal and customary law. The law also prohibits 
discrimination against women in access to employment or credit, education, pay, housing 
or in owning or managing businesses. However, contrary to the law women do 
experience discrimination in all these aspects of life.  
ICCPR- Civil and political rights  
Lesotho acceded to the ICCPR on September 9, 1992. In acceding to the ICCPR, 
Lesotho is legally bound to respect civil and political rights of individuals, including: 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, right to life and the right to due process and a 
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fair trial. For instance, Article 7 of the ICCPR states, “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one 
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”  
Although the constitution and law expressly prohibit such practices, in 2013 there 
were reported instances of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment by police. The Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) investigated 24 
reported cases of police allegedly torturing suspects.22 An instance of this abuse was an 
arrest made by police on June 27, 2013. Kabelo Makateng was arrested on the basis of 
assaulting a police officer; he was arrested and released seven days later without being 
charged. During his detention, four policemen allegedly blindfolded Makateng, burned 
his arms with an iron rod, poured hot water on his torso, and assaulted him with a 
knobkerrie. Police did not allow Makateng contact with family members during his 
detention.23 This is one example of the numerous obstacles Lesotho’s government faces 
as it works towards remedying its ICCPR violations.   
ICESCR- Economic and Social rights 
Lesotho’s government acceded to the ICESCR on September 9, 1992. Under this 
Covenant, Lesotho’s citizens have multiple socio-economic rights guaranteed to them; 
the right to health is included within those rights. According to ICESCR Article 12(1), 
“Right to Health: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
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health.” The right to health in general is important but in the case of Lesotho, it is critical 
because of the HIV/AIDs pandemic occurring within the country.  
Lesotho has the second highest HIV/AIDS prevalence in the world.  Twenty-nine 
percent of the population ages 15-49 years old experiences a cut in their life expectancy 
from 60 years old to a staggering 35 years.24 Approximately 23 percent of the population 
is infected and an estimated 358,700 people are living with HIV/AIDS.
25
 Lesotho is 
reportedly attempting to remedy this situation. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
offers counseling and testing for pregnant women as part of antenatal care. In government 
hospitals and clinics, pregnant women receive free antenatal check-ups and thereafter, 
their newborn babies are entitled to a free immunization course up to the age of 5 years 
including the vitamins and nutritional supplements.26  
 In an attempt to improve Lesotho citizens’ right to health, the country says that it 
is undergoing reforms to achieve a sustained increase in access to quality preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative health services throughout Lesotho. In 2011, 12.8 percent of 
its gross domestic product (GDP) was contributed to its health sector.
27
 Access to health 
services in the country is divided among four institutions, namely, the Government 
through the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Christian Health Association of 
Lesotho (CHAL), the Private Practitioners or Sector and Non-Governmental 
Organizations. In total, there are 20 hospitals with 2,466 beds, 157 health centers and four 
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 In terms of health care professionals, there is one doctor per 14,808 people 
and one nurse per 2,990 people.29 Fees for normal surgical deliveries are standardized in 
the hospitals while services in all health centers are free.30 In an effort to improve the 
number of hospitals, the government is building a 425-bed referral hospital in Lesotho’s 
capital, Maseru and three filter clinics.
31
 The Millennium Challenge Corporation is 
supporting the rehabilitation of 150 Health Centers, training of health professionals and 
construction of the National Laboratory.32  
On the Human Development Index (HDI), Lesotho ranks 158 out of 187 
countries, which places the country in the low human development category. The 2013 
Human Development Report stated, “[o]f 132 countries with a complete data series, only 
2 had a lower HDI value in 2012 than in 1990: Lesotho and Zimbabwe.”
33
 Among 
Lesotho’s numerous challenges is eradicating poverty, hunger, and the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Poverty, drought and the HIV/AIDS epidemic have rendered more than half of 
Lesotho dependent on food assistance.34 26.7 percent of the population is vulnerable to 
poverty and 11 percent of the population lives in severe poverty.35 In fact, 43 percent are 
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living on less than $1.25 a day.36 Despite emergency food donations, it seems unlikely 
that Lesotho will eradicate hunger or extreme poverty by 2015.37 
Reasons for Delay in Ratification 
As shown in Table 4.1, there was a delay of 14 to 16 years in ratifying CEDAW 
and ICCPR and ICESCR (an exception to the delays is the CRC, which gathered a rapid 
response from the Lesotho government and was ratified within two years of its signature). 
I look into the three factors previously mentioned as possible motives for Lesotho’s 
delay.  
Political Instability   
As already described the BNP was in power from 1966 until 1986. In the 20 years 
of the BNP little progress was made in the area of human rights. In fact, Prime Minister 
Jonathan abused his authority by suppressing human rights, specifically civil and political 
rights of Lesotho citizens. It was not until after the BNP was deposed that the military 
government ratified ICCPR and ICESCR. It is therefore clear that political instability was 
a major factor in the delay in ratifying these treaties, since 20 years transpired without 
either of the two treaties being signed nor ratified. CEDAW was signed under the BNP in 
1980 but not ratified until 1995. Between 1980 through 1986, the BNP had the 
opportunity to ratify CEDAW, but Jonathan’s authoritarian regime prevented any 
advancements in the area of human rights. The military government assumed power in 
1986 but did not ratify CEDAW until 1993. CEDAW was ratified by the new democratic 
administration under the BCP. I believe political instability served as Lesotho’s  reason 
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for delay due to the various political transitions the country endured. Although I deem 
political instability as the primary reason for delay I will investigate whether a lack of 
economic resources/ bureaucratic and cultural issues were a possibility in Lesotho 
delaying ratification. 
Lack of Economic Resources/ Bureaucratic Issues    
When a state ratifies a Convention it is obliged to carry out the mandates of the 
treaty via domestication. States are required to adopt legislation, build agencies and 
implement all the requirements mandated by human rights treaties. Country reports are 
also an essential obligation mandated under conventions.  Lesotho, as a least developed 
country, has experienced constraints which have prevented the country from fully 
complying with convention mandates. In the country’s Universal Periodic Report and 
CEDAW periodic reports, Lesotho has repeatedly expressed its limited capacity in 
explaining why it did not submit its reports on time. Lesotho has reported on the 
following Conventions: ICCPR in 1999, ICERD in 2000 and CRC in 2001, all of which 
were overdue. Due to very limited capacity it has been lagging behind in reporting on 
other conventions. Limited capacity has been the sole cited cause of delays in 
domesticating some of the conventions.38 When the Lesotho Minister of Justice and 
Human Rights and Correctional Services appeared before the 50
th
 session of the 
Committee on CEDAW, she stated that the late submission of the report was caused by 
insufficient financial and human resources. Lesotho’s continued economic constraints 
have hindered its ability to follow through with the required mandates of the conventions 
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but it may be, then, that concern about these responsibilities also played a role in delaying 
ratification in the first place. However, it is more likely that the lack of bureaucratic and 
economic resources played more of a factor in domesticating HRTs and not in ratifying 
treaties.   
Cultural Differences  
Lesotho has a dual legal system, Roman Dutch Law (common law) and Basotho 
customs (customary law). These two systems of law have equal validity with the proviso 
that in cases of inconsistency, statutory law prevails. However, the two systems cannot be 
applied simultaneously in a given situation. Lesotho’s legal duality poses a serious 
problem upon domestication of an HRT; custom and common law often conflict with one 
another. An example of the conflict Lesotho’s duality creates is demonstrated in the 
country’s ratification of CEDAW. The state ratified with a reservation on Article 2, 
which encompasses the domestication of the convention. Lesotho states under the 
reservation: 
The Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho declares that it does not consider itself 
bound by article 2 to the extent that it conflicts with Lesotho’s constitutional stipulations 




When Lesotho was approached by the Human Rights Council in their Universal Periodic 
Review to remove the reservation of Article 2 of CEDAW, the response was a follows: 
The recommendation does not enjoy the support of the Government of Lesotho in that it 
conflicts with the Basotho Customary Law of succession to the throne and Chieftainship. 
This would require extensive and comprehensive consultations.  
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Despite this, the legal duality could not be the primary reason for Lesotho’s delay in 
ratifying the convention, precisely because countries have a right to add reservations—
which Lesotho did.   
 In the next section, I turn to the hypothesis that Lesotho may have eventually 
ratified the HRTs for economic reasons and legitimacy.  
Aid 
What motives influenced Lesotho to ratify the conventions after its 20-year plus 
delay. Was it: (a) the prospect of receiving/maintaining the flow of economic aid (ODA), 
or (b) seeking legitimacy from the international community. The two are not mutually 
exclusive as legitimacy could lead to receiving more aid.   
Table 4.2 shows Lesotho’s ODA from 1980-1998, a timeframe selected on the 
basis of the dates of signature, accession/ratification of the ICESCR, ICCPR, and 
CEDAW. ODA is not dispersed immediately to countries in need but gradually over 
time; therefore the use of a three-year post ratification period was considered advisable.  
The chart reflects fluctuations in ODA, developmental food aid and humanitarian aid 
during this period (1998 represents three years after the ratification of CEDAW). 
Table 4.2 Lesotho ODA Breakdown  
 Year ODA (in 
millions dollars) 
Developmental 







1980 Signed CEDAW 93,160,000 12,080,000 .54 
1981  103,250,000 14,580,000 .46 
1982 92,350,000 7,290,000 .66 
1983 106,180,000 14,670,000 .72 
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1984 98,460,000 15,340,000 .63 
1985 92,180,000 11,470,000       .42 
1986 Government Transition 85,380,000 6,710,000 .29 
1987 104,850,000 7,310,000 .42 
1988 108,900,000 6,910,000 .37 
1989 134,510,000 4,260,000 .19 
1990 139,130,000 2,160,000 .17 
1991 123,310,000 4,650,000 .2 
1992 Acceded to ICCPR & ICESCR 143,160,000 6,060,000 .25 
1993 143,060,000 1,660,000 .17 
1994 115,620,000 .19 .05 
1995  BCP ratified CEDAW 125,650,000 12,690,000 .82 
1996 103,210,000 3,460,000 .44 
1997 91,340,000 .11 .19 
1998 61,170,000 1,550,000 .37 
    
Source: OECD, QWIDS Database   
Lesotho signed onto CEDAW on July 17, 1980 and in 1981, the women’s HRT 
went into force. At the time Lesotho was a Cold War ally and receiving a relatively high 
amount of aid despite its human rights problems. In the 1980s, however, ODA decreased 
as the regime moved away from the West and opposition also began to build against the 
regime.  As already noted, in 1982 the BNP opened embassies for the Eastern bloc. 
International donors could have interpreted Jonathan’s action as leaning towards the 
Communist bloc. Because of both, internal opposition and the turn to the left, Lesotho 
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experienced a decline in ODA in the early 1980s (except 1983). The overall ODA 
dropped to $85 million in 1986, the lowest figures in the 1980s. 1986 was the year 
Lesotho underwent a political transition, and the BNP was replaced in a bloodless coup. 
Initially donors did not react harshly to the military government that came to 
power after 1986. Although donors did not publicly denounce the military take-over and 
threaten suspension of economic assistance, they exerted a quiet diplomacy exhorting the 
military to return to multi-party rule.
40
 The Military Council was able to maintain a 
steady stream of ODA because it moved Lesotho back to being a firm Western ally. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, authoritarian regimes were put under pressure to accede 
to both political and economic liberalization.41 When Lesotho finally made the transition 
from military government into a democratic state it aligned its politics with the majority 
of its donors. In doing so Lesotho was growing closer to its donors, thus enjoying a boost 
in its ODA.  
In 1992 Lesotho’s military regime acceded to the 1966 treaties and it received a 
significant increase in aid of approximately $20 million dollars. Ratifying these HRTs 
certainly created a better relationship with the country’s donors, but the increase in 1992 
can be attributed to Lesotho’s call for help from donors to assist them with a drought that 
affected the country. The country received ODA from NGOs (USAID, Peace Corps, and 
AID) and donor countries in the form of humanitarian aid. The Peace Corps and AID 
donated approximately $580,000 and 5.7 million respectfully; those funds were aimed at 
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alleviating the effects of the drought.42 ODA for Lesotho was at an all-time high in 1992 
as can be seen in Table 3.2.  
After the 1993 elections, the BCP rose once more to power but it did not, 
however, take long before political instability threatened to wreck Lesotho’s 
democratization. In 1994, the BCP government locked horns in a fierce conflict with 
various forces including the security machinery, the monarchy and the opposition BNP.
43
 
When, at the climax of this power struggle, the King deposed the BCP government, some 
donors withheld aid and others threatened to do so, should the situation deteriorate. As 
belligerent parties eased their tensions early in 1995, it was assumed that donor 
confidence would be regained. In August 1995, an increase in aid occurred again when 
CEDAW was ratified.  In the period that CEDAW was ratified the military regime was 
no longer in power and the country had already undergone democratization two years 
earlier. Despite enduring political tensions the international community ODA 
contributions to Lesotho did not falter. 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy and good global citizenship motivated Lesotho to accede to HRTs. 
The two key years to observe are 1992 and 1995. As previously noted, Lesotho 
experienced a difficult period post BNP regime (1966-1986); after the coup deposed the 
BNP there was not much objection from the international community. Once the military 
junta was in power it had the opportunity to accede to the ICCPR and ICESCR. In 
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acceding to these HRTs the military junta appeared to be acting to legitimize itself 
internationally. As for the ratification of CEDAW, the BCP ratified the Convention at a 
time when the country had finally had made the transition to a democracy.  
 An example of Lesotho exercising good global citizenship is the rapid response 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Lesotho signed the CRC on August 21, 
1990 and ratified the HRT within two years on March 10, 1992.  The overall response by 
the international community was to address children’s rights quickly, with the majority of 
states signing and ratifying within four years of its entry to force in 1989. The global 
focus on children’s rights made the swift signing and ratification process a goal Lesotho 
accepted. It did not want to identify as a state that was not concerned with protecting its 
children and therefore it accelerated the signing and ratification of the CRC to prove it 
was pro children’s rights.    
Overall, legitimacy influenced Lesotho to ratify the human rights treaties. Their 
decision to ratify the ICCPR, ICESCR and CEDAW was done to maintain and sustain a 
relationship with its international donors. In appeasing donors, they also solidified 
themselves as legitimate members of the international community.  
In conclusion Lesotho received aid throughout the period of the military regime 
and democratization of the country, which suggests ratification was less about aid than 
legitimacy. Its search for legitimacy was heightened when the military regime decided to 
ratify treaties. Due the oppressive nature of military governments it would use ratification 





Chapter 5- Bangladesh  
Background 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh is located in Southeastern Asia, bordering 
the Bay of Bengal, between Burma and India.
1
 Bangladesh is one of the world’s most 
densely populated countries, ranking in ninth place for the highest populated country in 
the world.
2
  It has an area of 143,998 square kilometers and its population was expected 
to reach 166,280,712 by July 2014.
3
 Bangladesh is considered a Least Developed 
Country and has been on the Committee for Development list since 1975.       
Political History 
Bangladesh, formally East Pakistan, gained its independence from West Pakistan 
on March 26, 1971. West Pakistan was politically and economically dominant within 
Pakistan, giving rise to a secessionist movement in the eastern province. Despite attempts 
to ease tensions, these grievances grew into open hostility. In 1971, a brief but bloody 
civil war flared up that lasted for two weeks and ended with the intervention of Indian 
troops and the subsequent independence of West Pakistan.
4
 Like many countries which 
have gained their independence, Bangladesh experienced political turbulence and military 
coups in 1975, 1981 and 1982. From 1971 through 1990, the country had five different 
heads of state, two of whom obtained their power via military coups.  
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Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had led the revolution against West Pakistan and had 
subsequently been exiled. He returned from political exile in 1972 and became Prime 
Minister. Mujibur Rahman relied on nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy as 
appropriate ideologies to assist in governing Bangladesh. In the following years, 
however, he discarded everything Bangladesh theoretically represented: 
constitutionalism, freedom of speech, rule of law, the right to dissent and equal 
opportunity of employment.
5
 In the economic sphere, he introduced a program of 
nationalization of all key industries as a way to improve the living standards within the 
country. Mujibur Rahman’s nationalization program had little success and the country 
started to enter into an economic decline.  His economic policies, particularly the 
nationalization of industries, contributed to Bangladesh’s economic chaos, which was 
compounded by natural disasters (i.e. widespread flooding and famine). This created 
severe hardship for the people of Bangladesh.  
By 1974, political unrest was so severe that Mujibur Rahman declared a state of 
emergency. In January 1975, Mujibur Rahman became president of Bangladesh. He 
amended the constitution to make himself president for five years and gave himself full 
executive powers. His presidency was short-lived, however, because in August of 1975, a 
military coup comprising young majors with a personal vendetta against Mujib, 
assassinated him.   
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Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed assumed the presidency; he announced that 
parliamentary democracy would be restored by February 1977.
6
 Mushtaque promised to 
dissolve the authoritarian power that Mujib had invested in the office of the presidency. 
However, the continuing unstable situation in Bangladesh did not improve enough to 
permit a significant degree of liberalization.
7
 Mujib loyalists overthrew Mushtaque in 
November 1975. General Zia Rahman assumed the presidency and made himself martial 
law administrator in November 1976. Rahman was considered ruthless for his treatment 
of the political opposition. He established the political party, Bangladesh National Party 
(BNP), and governed the country until May 30, 1981, when he was assassinated by a 
military coup. The Bangladeshi people would once again welcome a new head of state, 
Abdus Sattar. Sattar would not stay in power for long, for General Ershad deposed him 
on March 24, 1982. Ershad suspended the constitution, disbanded the Parliament, 
prohibited all political activities and deprived the President, Vice President and cabinet 
ministers of their offices.
8
 Echoing the words of many past military leaders, Ershad 
announced that the military, as the only organized power in the nation, had been forced to 
take over until elections could be held.
9
 He declared that Bangladesh would return to 
democratic rule in about two years. Martial law lasted until November 1986, but Ershad 
remained in power for the next seven years (December 11, 1983 – December 6, 1990).  
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In 1991, the first free and fair elections were held in Bangladesh. Begum Khaleda 
Zia, Zia Rahman’s widow and her party (BNP) won the elections and she became Prime 
Minister. Her administration achieved the reinstatement through a constitutional 
amendment of a parliamentary (as opposed to presidential) form of government and 
introduced economic and educational reform.
10
 Her tenure as prime minister was 
hampered, however, by strikes instigated by the Awami League (AL) and other 
opposition parties and by a cyclone in 1991, which killed approximately 130,000 
people.
11
 In the February 1996 parliamentary elections, the BNP won an overwhelming 
victory. The BNP victory was short-lived, as only a small percentage of eligible voters  
had cast ballots, heeding a boycott called by the Awami League. Khaleda came under 
immense pressure to resign, and six weeks later she stepped down. In subsequent 
elections, former President Mujibur Rahman’s daughter, Hasina Mujibur, was elected 
into office. The political situation did not improve much during Hasina’s tenure in office. 
The BNP regularly boycotted the parliament, and antigovernment demonstrations were 
common. In addition to political issues, the country also was beset in 1998 by a 
disastrous monsoon that flooded some two-thirds of Bangladesh’s territory for two 
months and left more than 30 million people homeless.
12  
In 2001 Khaleda promised to eliminate corruption and was returned to office. The 
victory, however, did little to curb the tension between the BNP and the Awami League. 
By the end of Khaleda’s second term, minimal progress had been made towards 
controlling corruption. She stepped down as prime minister in late 2006. However, unrest 








between the BNP and AL led the interim head of government to resign and to install a 
new caretaker administration before the polls opened.
13
  In January 2007, a state of 
emergency was declared and elections were canceled. The new caretaker government 
embarked on an aggressive program to rid the country of corruption prior to holding 
elections. Meanwhile, the tension between Khaleda and Hasina continued, and their 
conflict was perceived by the administration as a hindrance to the country’s stability. In 
2007 both women were arrested, Khaleda on charges of corruption and Hasina on charges 
of extortion. Both were released from custody in 2008. General elections were held in 
December of 2008, and the Awami League captured the majority of seats in parliament. 
Hasina returned as prime minister.  As the years progressed, Bangladesh’s political arena 
continued to experience turmoil. In 2011, a change in the Bangladeshi constitution 
discarded the provision for a neutral caretaker government to oversee elections. The 
removal of this provision created tension during the 2013 national elections. The BNP 
boycotted the elections to demand the reinstatement of the Caretaker Government 
system.
14
 Hasina was declared prime minister for the third time in these elections. 
Today, Bangladesh continues to be a contentious parliamentary democracy. The 
country has a strong two-party system with governments alternating regularly between 
political coalitions led by the AL and BNP. However, the level of political violence in 
Bangladesh remains relevantly high. Endemic corruption and criminality, weak rule of 
law, limited bureaucratic transparency and political polarization have long undermined 
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 Bangladesh  placed 144th out of 177 countries in the 2013 
Corruption Perceptions Index.
16
   
Human Rights Issues 
Despite Bangladesh’s problematic political transitions, it managed to 
accede/ratify the core HRTs (see Table 5.1 below). The U.S. State Department’s Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 noted, “The most significant human rights 
problems were arbitrary arrests, regulation of online speech, and poor working conditions 
and labor rights.”
17
  In addition to those issues, Bangladesh suffers from politically 
motivated violence and pervasive official corruption.  There are instances of authorities 
infringing on citizens’ privacy rights.
18
 Women are suffering from unequal treatment and 
children are compelled to work, particularly in the informal sector, due either to 
economic necessity or in some instances, trafficking.
19
  
Table 5.1: Ratification of Human Rights Treaties by Bangladesh (1971) 
Core Human Rights Treaties Date of Signature Date of Ratification, accession 
or succession  
ICERD (1966)  June 11, 1979a 
ICESCR  (1966)  October 5, 1998a 
ICCPR  (1966)  September 6, 2000a  
CEDAW (1979)  November 6, 1984a   
CAT (1984)  October 5, 1998a 
CRC (1989) October 26, 1990 August 3, 1990 
 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 








On the Human Development Index in 2013, Bangladesh ranked 142 out of 187 
countries.
20
  Ranking 142 classifies Bangladesh as a country in the low human 
development category. Bangladesh faces numerous obstacles which prevent the country 
from moving up in rank. The most difficult challenge for Bangladesh is the eradication of 
poverty.  Approximately, 43 percent of the people live on $1.25 a day and 31 percent of 
the population live below the national poverty line.
21
 41 percent of the country’s children 
suffer from moderate to severe malnutrition. Primary education enrollment rates are at an 
astonishingly high 114 percent but are accompanied by a 33 percent dropout rate.
22
 Since 
some children are obliged to assist the household economically, and not all children can 
pursue a secondary education so only 26 percent of the population obtain secondary 
education. Bangladesh enshrines human rights in its constitution. Part II, Article 2 states, 
“The Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms 
and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person shall be guaranteed and in 
which effective participation by the people through their elected representatives in 
administration at all levels shall be ensured.” Theoretically these rights are ensured to the 
Bangladeshi population but lack of resources, among other factors, make it difficult for 
the people to fully enjoy their rights.  
In spite of the steep challenges posed by lack of resources and capacity, climate 
change and natural disasters, Bangladesh has, according to the UN, made noteworthy 
progress in achieving some key gender and health related MDGs and a higher pace of 
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human development compared to other South Asian countries.
23
 In the following section, 
the ICCPR and ICESCR will be selected to highlight some of Bangladesh’s challenges in 
the area of socio-economic rights, and civil/ political rights.   
ICCPR- Civil and Political Rights      
Part III, Article 32 of Bangladesh’s Constitution states: “No person shall be 
deprived of life or personal liberty save in accordance to the law.”
24
 However, the media 
and local and international human rights organizations have reported that the government 
or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, which goes against this 
constitutional protected human right.
25
 The government has neither released statistics on 
total killings by security personnel nor put in place comprehensive measures to 
investigate cases, despite previous statements by high-ranking officials that the 
government would show “zero tolerance” and fully investigate all extrajudicial killings 
by security forces. According to the media and local human rights organizations, no case 
resulted in criminal punishment during 2013 and, in the few instances in which the 




                                                          
23 Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, National Report Submitted in Accordance 
with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21*: Bangladesh, 
Universal Periodic Review (Geneva: United Nations, February 7, 2013), http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/168/33/PDF/G0816833.pdf?OpenElement. 
24 Bangladesh Government, “Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh” (International 
Relations and Security Network, November 4, 1972), 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bangladesh-constitution.pdf. 
25 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for 2013: Bangladesh.” 
73 
 
ICESCR- Social, Economic and Cultural Rights  
Article 7 of ICESCR states: “The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work.” Forced 
labor is common in Bangladesh and defies the provision about just and favorable work 
conditions of Article 7. It must be noted that Bangladesh made a declaration on Article 7 
of the ICESCR.
26
 The declaration states: 
The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh will apply article 7 
under the conditions and in conformity with the procedures established in the 
Constitution and the relevant legislation of Bangladesh. 
Article 34 (1) of the constitution protects citizens against forced labor in stating, 
“All forms of forced labor are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be 
an offense punishable in accordance to the law.”
27
 However, the prescribed penalty of 
imprisonment for up to one year or a fine is not sufficiently stringent to deter violations, 
and the government does not enforce the law effectively. According to the U.S. State 
Department, children and adults are forced into domestic servitude and bonded labor that 






                                                          
26 States make declarations as to their understanding of some matter or as to the interpretation of a 
particular provision. Unlike reservations, declarations merely clarify the state’s position and do 
not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty. 
27 Bangladesh Government, “Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.” 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bangladesh-constitution.pdf 
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Reasons for Delay in Ratification 
As shown in Table 5.1, Bangladesh experienced a significant delay in ratifying 
three out of the six core human rights treaties (the ICCPR and the ICESCR). I will be 
focusing  on the ICCPR and ICESCR and the reasons for their delay. I propose the 
following three options as possible reasons for the delay: (a) political instability; (b) lack 
of economic resources/bureaucratic issues; (c) cultural differences.  
Political Instability 
As we can see from the political history, there was constant instability from the 
time of independence to the present. Beginning with the secession in 1971 and 
throughout the 1990s, Bangladesh endured various heads of state with different political 
objectives, none of which prioritized human rights treaty ratifications on their political 
agendas. The constant change of governments and coups created volatility within the 
country and understandably must have had some effect on Bangladesh’s ratification.  
When the first free and fair elections were held in 1991, it was assumed that 
concern for human rights would be prioritized in the country. However, even though 
1991 through 1998 was perceived to be a relatively stable political period, the BNP only 
managed to ratify the ICESCR on October 5, 1998. The expectation was that the 
administration would have ratified HRTs at an earlier time due to its democratization in 
1991. Since little progress was made during this period we must move onto another 
explanation for Bangladesh’s delay in ratifying the ICESCR.  
Instability persisted beyond 1998 and into the 2000s, but the ICCPR was ratified 
by Bangladesh on September 6, 2000. Instability does not therefore seem to have been 
the core reason for the delay in ratifying these conventions.  
75 
 
Lack of Economic Resources/Bureaucratic Issues  
Like most LDCs, Bangladesh, has experienced difficulties primarily as a result of 
economic constraints which have prevented it from fully committing itself to the human 
rights treaties. It must be noted that lack of economic resources impacts bureaucratic 
capability in that some states are not able to afford the construction of agencies, fund 
programs, and pay the staff that will run human rights programs. During Bangladesh’s 
first Universal Periodic Review in 2009 Bangladesh noted, 
Poverty hinders the fulfillment of rights particularly of children and women who 
are the most vulnerable. Bangladesh, an LDC, faces multi-dimensional challenges 
in fulfilling its commitment to promotion and protection of human rights 
primarily because of lack of resources.
29
     
Its lack of economic resources has contributed to its inability to meet the HRTs mandates. 
The UPR also mentioned,   
Notwithstanding encouraging advances in human development, poverty continues 
to be a critical area of concern for the nation. About 40 percent of Bangladesh’s 
population is poor. This combined with the fact that Bangladesh is traditionally 
disaster-prone, which has witnessed an increased frequency due largely to 
greenhouse gas emission induced climate change, has been a major challenge to 
its human rights and development initiatives. Economic condition being one of 
the major root causes of violation and unfulfilment of many fundamental and 
human rights, Bangladesh has adopted holistic and multi-pronged approaches 
aimed at alleviating human poverty on the one hand and ensuring human rights of 
its citizens, on the other.
30
 
Bangladesh acknowledges the importance of human rights but the country’s lack of 
economic resources has hindered its ability to fulfill its obligations post ratification. But 
this does not explain why Bangladesh delayed in ratifying the treaties. Lack of economic 
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resources and bureaucratic issues slowed the domestication of the conventions but there 
was no evidence that these concerns prevented ratification in the first place.  
Cultural Differences  
While Islam is not directly relevant to the ICCPR and ICESCR, CEDAW contains 
certain provisions which conflict with Islamic laws. The country acceded to CEDAW 
with reservations on the Conventions Articles 2 and 16(1)(c):  
Article 2: States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women and, to this end, undertake: 
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national 
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, 
through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle; 
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where 
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; 
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to 
ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective 
protection of women against any act of discrimination; 
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and 
to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this 
obligation; 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any 
person, organization or enterprise; 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women; 
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against 
women. 
Article 16: 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and 
in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
 (c) The same rights and responsibility during marriage and at its dissolution  
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These two articles are essential because they set out the requirements needed to 
implement the Convention. Without these articles outlining the mandates the treaty is 
virtually useless.  
Bangladesh’s reservation to Articles 2 and 16(1)(c) states: 
The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh does not consider as 
binding upon itself the provisions of article 2, [... and ...] 16 (1) (c) as they 
conflict with  Sharia law based on Holy Quran and Sunna.
31
  
Of the core human right treaties, CEDAW was the only one in which Bangladesh 
added a reservation on the basis of religion. Despite the reservation, it acceded to the 
Convention four years after it was established.  
 Reasons for Ratifying in 1998 and 2000 
Aid 
Was the prospect of economic aid a factor in ratification in 1998 and 2000? 
Table 5.2 Bangladesh ODA Breakdown  
Year ODA (in 
millions dollars) 
Developmental 







1995 1,281,740,000 104.52 20.6 
1996 1,228,070,000 94.29 13.32 
1997 1,012,360,000 112.77 7.42 
1998 Severe Monsoon ICESCR a 1,162,860,000 80.23 35.61 
1999 1,219,430,000 113.31     18.8 
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 United Nations, “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women: Country Ratification.” 
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2000 Accedes to ICCPR  1,172,840,000 77.65 11.92 
2001 1,043,740,000 104.96 14.19 
2002 906,250,000 68.81 22.66 
2003 1,394,890,000 65.39 5.54 
2004 1,413,850,000 61.85 80.48 
Source: OECD, QWIDS database   
Table 5.2 shows Bangladesh’s ODA from 1995-2004, a timeframe selected on the 
basis of signature, accession/ratification of the ICESCR and ICCPR. 2004 represents 
three years after the ratification of ICCPR. As stated in the last chapters, ODA is not 
dispersed immediately to countries in need but gradually over time, therefore the use of a 
three-year post ratification period was considered advisable.  The chart reflects 
Bangladesh’s steady flow of ODA, developmental food aid and humanitarian aid during 
this period.  
 Bangladesh acceded to the ICESCR on October 5, 1998. Bangladesh’s accession 
came at a time when there was conflict between the BNP and AL but much more, 
importantly, the country was affected by a severe monsoon. The monsoon impacted two-
thirds of the country, one of the worse natural disasters to ever be recorded.  The 
international community was well aware of Bangladesh’s vulnerability to harsh weather 
conditions since the country has a long history of natural disasters. Between 1980 and 
2008, it experienced 219 natural disasters, causing over $16 billion dollars in total 
damage.
32
 Seeing that Bangladesh is prone to natural disasters, Bangladesh continuously 
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received a steady flow of ODA. These contributions were made to assist the country in 
recovering for natural disasters. There were no grave fluctuations in ODA for the 
designated timeframe, which leads to the conclusion that ODA was not a factor in 
Bangladesh’s decision to ratify.  
Bangladesh’s 1998 tragic monsoon demonstrated the international donors’ 
commitment to Bangladesh. ODA increased, symbolizing the immediate response of the 
international community to assist Bangladesh. Despite the political turmoil the country 
was undergoing, ODA remained constant through Bangladesh’s accession to the ICCPR 
on September 6, 2000. Despite undergoing political turmoil and enduring natural 
disasters, which left the country in deplorable conditions, Bangladesh managed to ratify 
the ICESCR and ICCPR.  
Legitimacy 
  Bangladesh has sought legitimacy in ratifying human rights treaties. They 
wanted to be viewed as a legitimate member of the international community by acceding 
to these treaties. The monsoon of 1998 occurred in July of that same year and yet the 
Bangladesh government was able to accede to an HRT just four months later. The 
aftermath of this monsoon left the country in deplorable conditions, with two-thirds of the 
country underwater, approximately 30 million people homeless and hundreds dead. Even 
so, the government managed to accede to the ICESCR, demonstrating commitment on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(July 21, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm. 





Bangladesh’s behalf. Although it was experiencing extreme hardship, the country 
progressed in the area of human rights.  
Overall, the desire for legitimacy is the most plausible explanation for Bangladesh 
ratifying human rights treaties. While aid was not an incentive for ratification, it should 
be remembered that in seeking legitimacy, countries also appease donors. Bangladesh 
was able to sustain a relatively high level of aid throughout the period and ratifying 















Chapter 6- Conclusion  
This thesis argues that LDCs are motivated to ratify treaties by the prospect of 
obtaining economic aid and/or obtaining legitimacy in the international community. As 
the poorest and weakest segment of the international community, LDCs are more 
susceptible to ratifying in exchange for aid and some states, especially those with 
political problems, may ratify to appear as good global citizens. In explaining LDCs’ 
motives for ratification I found it critical to first investigate why they delayed ratification 
by ten years or more, before discussing the central issue of the impact of aid and 
legitimacy. Typically states ratify not long after a treaty enters into force. For a state to 
postpone ratification by a decade or more, a significant factor must have been involved. 
For this reason I proposed the following three as plausible obstacles: (a) political 
instability; (b) lack of bureaucratic and economic issues; and/or (c) cultural issues.  
These impediments were chosen because they are logical internal factors which 
could prevent states from ratifying. As mentioned in Chapter 3, after a majority of 
African and Southeast Asian countries obtained their independence from their European 
colonial rulers, a few newly independent countries acquired stable governments almost 
immediately while others experienced authoritarian or military regimes. Political 
instability within a country was important to examine in this thesis because instability 
creates turbulence which manifests in various forms- - disagreements among political 
factions, coups that depose weak administrations, and/or the establishment of an 
authoritarian or military regime -- and unfortunately, political instability was a frequent 
occurrence in the African and Asian-Pacific region. 
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Lesotho and Bangladesh were selected as regional case studies representing the 
African and Asian- Pacific regions. In looking at Lesotho and Bangladesh I found that 
only Lesotho postponed ratification due to political instability. Lesotho ratified the 
International Covenant and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 26 years after those treaties 
entered into force. Lesotho was delayed in ratifying CEDAW by 15 years. The country 
endured a one party rule for 20 years (1970-1986) followed by a seven year military 
regime (1986-1993). These administrations hindered Lesotho’s ability to ratify those 
HRTs. In Bangladesh’s case, political instability was not the main obstacle postponing 
the ratification of the ICESCR and ICCPR. The country democratized in 1991 and 
experienced a relatively stable period until 1998. Since little progress was made towards 
ratifying human rights treaties during this period, it was determined that political 
instability was not the primary impediment in Bangladesh’s case.   
The second impediment I considered was the lack of bureaucratic and economic 
resources. Bureaucratic issues are experienced in all countries but are amplified in LDCs. 
Resources are essential to HRT ratification because once a treaty is ratified, it must be 
domesticated. The process requires creating new legislation and implementing it, 
establishing programs and submitting periodic reports, which comes at an additional cost 
and could be perceived as a financial burden for these states. LDCs are impoverished 
states and the added costs of domesticating treaties may influence a state to reconsider its 
decision to ratify immediately. Aside from economic costs, other pressing and unforeseen 
issues such as natural disasters may impede an administration from ratifying.   
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Bangladesh postponed ratifying the ICESCR by 24 years and the ICCPR by 26 
years. Bangladesh accredits the lack of resources for its inability to domesticate the 
mandated provisions, but there is no reason to believe that this led to them postponing the 
ratification of these treaties. Lesotho experienced a similar situation to that of 
Bangladesh. It blamed its limited capacity as its sole reason for delay in domesticating 
conventions but once again this does not seem to have affected the actual ratification.  
Culture is an integral part of society; if a human rights treaty is not aligned with 
cultural beliefs of a country, it may cause a delay. For this reason cultural differences 
were selected as a third impediment in ratification of treaties. Culture affects an entire 
population. In Bangladesh the attitude towards women affected the interpretation of 
Article 2 of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). Lesotho’s dual legal system created issues for the domestication of human 
rights treaties. As a deeply-rooted component in society, culture can be very influential 
and deserves to be researched further.  
The central hypothesis of my work was that LDCs ratify HRTs for economic and 
legitimacy purposes. In looking at my two cases, I found little support for the idea that 
aid was a direct motivation for ratifying treaties. In both cases, they were already 
receiving a substantial amount of aid during the period of ratification and therefore there 
was no further incentive needed to ratify HRTs. On the other hand, ratification is a social 
norm and once one country ratifies a treaty others will follow suit.  Bangladesh’s 
international donors, which have always provided aid to the country in the most desperate 
times, have adhered to human rights norms and expect recipient countries to do the same. 
In ratifying, Bangladesh therefore solidified its relationship with its donors and 
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simultaneously appeared to acting as a good global citizen. As for Lesotho, the Military 
Council ratified the ICESCR and ICCPR in order to legitimize the administration. As 
reflected in the quick ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
Lesotho clearly also wants to be seen as a good global citizen.  
While my research has not shown definitively that aid is an influential factor in 
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